Chapter 15

Stops and Warrantless Searches

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Five Basic Steps

15.1 General Approach

A. Five Basic Steps

This chapter outlines a five-step approach for analyzing typical “street encounters” with police. It covers situations involving both pedestrians and occupants of vehicles. For a fuller discussion of warrantless searches and seizures, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2012) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE] and ROBERT L. FARB, ARREST, SEARCH, AND INVESTIGATION IN NORTH CAROLINA (UNC School of Government, 4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter FARB].


The five steps are:

1. Did the officer seize the defendant?
2. Did the officer have grounds for the seizure?
3. Did the officer act within the scope of the seizure?
4. Did the officer have grounds to arrest or search?
5. Did the officer act within the scope of the arrest or search?

Generally, if an officer lacks authorization at any particular step, evidence uncovered by the officer as a result of the unauthorized action is subject to suppression. A flowchart outlining these steps is attached to this chapter as Appendix 15-1.

B. Authority to Act without Warrant

In many (although not all) of the situations described in this chapter, an officer may act without first obtaining a warrant. The courts have long expressed a preference, however, for the use of both arrest and search warrants—even in situations where a warrant is not required. See *State v. Hardy*, 339 N.C. 207, 226 (1994) (“search and seizure of property unaccompanied by prior judicial approval in the form of a warrant is per se unreasonable unless the search falls within a well-delineated exception to warrant requirement”); *State v. Nixon*, 160 N.C. App. 31, 34–35 (2003), relying on *Aguilar v. Texas*, 378 U.S. 108, 110–11 (1964) (“informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates . . . are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers” (citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); see also *Flippo v. West Virginia*, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (court states that “warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement”; court rejects any “homicide crime scene” exception to warrant requirement); *United States v. Ventresca*, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (“in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall”); *Beck v. Ohio*, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause”).

C. Effect of Constitutional and State Law Violations

Most of this chapter deals with violations of the U.S. Constitution, for which the remedy is suppression of evidence that is unconstitutionally obtained.

To the extent it provides greater protection, state constitutional law provides a basis for suppression of illegally obtained evidence. In the search and seizure context, the North Carolina courts have found that protections under the North Carolina Constitution differ from federal constitutional protections in limited instances. See *State v. Carter*, 322 N.C. 709 (1988) (rejecting good faith exception to exclusionary rule under state constitution); see also supra “Good faith exception for constitutional violations not valid in North Carolina” in § 14.2B, Search Warrants (discussing case law and impact of recent legislation). Several states have recognized additional circumstances in which their state constitutions provide greater protections than under the U.S. Constitution. Examples are cited in this chapter. North Carolina defense counsel should remain alert to opportunities for differentiating the North Carolina Constitution from more limited federal protections.

Substantial statutory violations also may warrant suppression under Section 15A-974 of
the North Carolina General Statutes (hereinafter G.S.). In 2011, the N.C. General Assembly amended G.S. 15A-974, effective for trials and hearings commencing on or after July 1, 2011, to provide a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for statutory violations. See 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 6 (H 3). For a further discussion of statutory violations and the effect of the 2011 legislation, see supra “Good faith exception for constitutional violations not valid in North Carolina” in § 14.2B, Search Warrants, and § 14.5, Substantial Violations of Criminal Procedure Act.

Violations of other states’ laws, not based on federal constitutional requirements or North Carolina law, generally do not provide a basis for suppression. See State v. Hernandez, 208 N.C. App. 591, 604 (2010) (declining to suppress evidence for violation of New Jersey state constitution); see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (Virginia law enforcement officers who had probable cause to arrest defendant for a misdemeanor did not violate Fourth Amendment when they arrested him and conducted search incident to arrest although state law did not authorize an arrest); cf. State v. Stitt, 201 N.C. App. 233 (2009) (even if State did not fully comply with 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act in obtaining records pertaining to cell phones possessed by defendant, federal law did not provide for suppression remedy).

15.2 Did the Officer Seize the Defendant?

The Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from stopping, or “seizing,” a person without legally sufficient grounds, and evidence obtained by an officer after seizing a person may not be used to justify the seizure. See FARB at 27. It is therefore critical for Fourth Amendment purposes to determine exactly when a seizure occurs.

A. Consensual Encounters

“Free to leave” test. As a general rule, a person is seized when, in view of all of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not “free to leave.” See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (when a person’s freedom of movement is restricted for reasons independent of police conduct, such as when a person is a passenger on a bus, the test is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officer’s requests or terminate the encounter).

The “free to leave” test used to determine whether a person has been seized requires a lesser degree of restraint than the test for “custody” used to determine whether a person is entitled to Miranda warnings. See State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332 (2001) (test for custody is whether there was formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of degree associated with formal arrest); see also infra § 15.4G, Does Miranda Apply? (discussing circumstances in which Miranda warnings may be required following a seizure).

A seizure clearly occurs if an officer takes a person into custody, physically restrains the person, or otherwise requires the person to submit to the officer’s authority. An encounter
may be considered “consensual” and not a seizure, however, if a person willingly engages in conversation with an officer.

Factors. Factors to consider in determining whether an encounter is consensual or a seizure include:

- number of officers present,
- display of weapon by officer,
- physical touching of defendant,
- use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance is required,
- holding a person’s identification papers or property,
- blocking the person’s path, and
- activation or shining of lights.


Cases finding a seizure include: State v. Icard, 363 N.C. 303 (2009) (defendant was seized where officer initiated encounter, telling occupants of vehicle that the area was known for drug crimes and prostitution; was armed and in uniform; called for backup assistance; illuminated vehicle in which defendant was sitting with blue lights; knocked twice on defendant’s window; and when defendant did not respond opened car door and asked defendant to exit, produce identification, and bring purse; backup officer also illuminated defendant’s side of vehicle with take-down lights); State v. Harwood, ___ N.C. App. ___, 727 S.E.2d 891 (2012) (defendant was seized when officers parked directly behind his stopped vehicle, drew their firearms, ordered the defendant and his passenger to exit the vehicle, and placed defendant on the ground and handcuffed him); State v. Haislip, 186 N.C. App. 275 (2007) (defendant was seized where officer fell in behind defendant, activated blue lights, and after defendant parked car, got out, and began walking away, approached her and got her attention), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 362 N.C. 499 (2008) (remanded to trial court for written findings of fact and conclusions of law).

Cases not finding a seizure include: State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644 (2005) (defendant was not seized when officer parked her car in lot without turning on blue light or siren, approached defendant as defendant was walking from car to store, and asked defendant if she could speak with him; after talking with defendant, officer asked defendant to “hold up” while officer transmitted defendant’s name to dispatcher; assuming that this statement constituted seizure, officer had developed reasonable suspicion by then to detain defendant); State v. Williams, 201 N.C. App. 566, 571 (2009) (officer parked his patrol car on the opposite side of the street from the driveway in which defendant was parked, did not activate the siren or blue lights on his patrol car, did not remove his gun from its holster, or use any language or display a demeanor suggesting that defendant was not free to leave); State v. Johnston, 115 N.C. App. 711 (1994) (defendant was not seized
where trooper drove over to where defendant’s car was already parked, defendant voluntarily stepped out of car before trooper arrived, and trooper then exited his car and walked over to defendant).

**B. Chases**

Even if a reasonable person would not have felt “free to leave,” the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a seizure does not occur until there is a physical application of force or submission to a show of authority. See *California v. Hodari D.*, 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (when police are chasing person who is running away, person is not “seized” until person is caught or gives up chase); *State v. Eaton*, 210 N.C. App. 142 (2011) (defendant was not seized before he discarded plastic baggie containing pills); *State v. Leach*, 166 N.C. App. 711 (2004) (following *Hodari D.* and holding that officers had not seized defendant until they detained him after high speed chase); *State v. West*, 119 N.C. App. 562 (1995) (following *Hodari D.*).

For example, under *Hodari D.*, if an officer directs a car to pull over, a seizure occurs when the driver stops, thus submitting to the officer’s authority. A seizure also could occur when a person tries to get away from the police in an effort to terminate a consensual encounter. See *United States v. Wilson*, 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991) (defendant initially agreed to speak with officer and produced identification at officer’s request, but then declined request for consent to search and tried to leave; officer effectively seized defendant by following defendant and repeatedly asking for consent to search); see also infra § 15.3D, Flight (flight from consensual or illegal encounter does not provide grounds to stop person for resisting, delaying, or obstructing officer).

Generally, evidence observed or obtained before a seizure is not subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment. See *State v. Eaton*, 210 N.C. App. 142 (2011) (defendant was not seized before he discarded plastic baggie containing pills; because defendant abandoned baggie in public place and seizure had not yet occurred, officer’s recovery of baggie did not violate Fourth Amendment). If a defendant discards property as a result of illegal police action, however, he or she may move to suppress the evidence as the fruit of illegal action. See *State v. Joe*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 730 S.E.2d 779 (2012) (officers did not have grounds to arrest defendant for resisting an officer for ignoring their command to stop; bag of cocaine cannot be held to have been voluntarily abandoned by defendant when abandonment was product of unlawful arrest; suppression motion granted), review granted, ___ N.C. ___, 736 S.E.2d 187 (2013).

**C. Race-Based “Consensual” Encounters**

If officers select a defendant for a “consensual” encounter because of the defendant’s race, evidence obtained during the encounter potentially could be suppressed on equal protection and due process grounds. See *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (Equal Protection prohibits selective enforcement of law based on considerations such as race); *United States v. Avery*, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997); *United States v. Taylor*, 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992); see also *United States v. Washington*, 490 F.3d 765 (9th Cir.
2007) (in totality of circumstances, encounter between two white police officers and African-American defendant was not consensual, as a reasonable person in defendant’s circumstances would not have felt free to leave; court relied on, among other things, strained relations between police and African-American community and reputation of police among African-Americans).

If an officer’s actions amount to a stop, racial motivation also may undermine the credibility of non-racial reasons asserted by the officer as the basis for the stop. See infra § 15.3M, Race-Based Stops.

In recognition of the potential for racial profiling, North Carolina law requires the Division of Criminal Information of the N.C. Department of Justice to collect statistics on traffic stops by state troopers and other state law enforcement officers. See G.S. 114-10.01. This statute also requires the Division to collect statistics on many local law enforcement agencies. Unless a specific statutory exception exists, records maintained by state and local government agencies are public records. See generally News and Observer Publishing Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465 (1992).

D. Selected Actions before Seizure Occurs

Running tags. See State v. Chambers, 203 N.C. App. 373, at *2 (2010) (unpublished) (“Defendant's license tag was displayed, as required by North Carolina law, on the back of his vehicle for all of society to view. Therefore, defendant did not have a subjective or objective reasonable expectation of privacy in his license tag. As such, the officer’s actions did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.”).

Installation of GPS tracking device. See United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Government’s attachment of GPS device to vehicle to track vehicle’s movements was search under the Fourth Amendment); see also Jeff Welty, Advice to Officers after Jones, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012) (observing that Jones requires that officers ordinarily obtain prior judicial authorization to attach GPS device to vehicle), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=3250.

15.3 Did the Officer Have Grounds for the Seizure?

A. Reasonable Suspicion

Officers may make a brief investigative stop of a person—that is, they may seize a person—if they have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by the person. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412 (2008) (holding that U.S. Constitution allows traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion); State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513 (Wash. 2002) (holding that although Terry authorizes stop based on reasonable suspicion of criminal offense and possibility of noncriminal traffic violation, it does not authorize stop based on reasonable suspicion of other noncriminal infractions). For a further discussion of the standard for traffic stops, see infra § 15.3E, Traffic Stops.
Factors to consider in determining reasonable suspicion include:

- the officer’s personal observations,
- information the officer receives from others,
- time of day or night,
- the suspect’s proximity to where a crime was recently committed,
- the suspect’s reaction to the officer’s presence, including flight, and
- the officer’s knowledge of the suspect’s prior criminal record

See also United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011) (in holding that stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, court stated, “[w]e also note our concern about the inclination of the Government toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity” and “we are deeply troubled by the way in which the Government attempts to spin these largely mundane acts into a web of deception”).

B. High Crime or Drug Areas

Presence in a high crime or drug area, standing alone, does not constitute reasonable suspicion. Other factors providing reasonable suspicion must be present. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (defendant’s presence with others on a corner known for drug-related activity did not justify investigatory stop); State v. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. 165 (1992) (following Brown); see also United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 488 (4th Cir. 2011) (disallowing stop and frisk of person based on generic anonymous tip; court states that allowing officer’s actions “would be tantamount to permitting a regime of general searches of virtually any individual residing in or found in high-crime neighborhoods”).

Although not extensively discussed in the North Carolina cases, some courts have questioned the characterization of a neighborhood as a high crime area and have required the State to make an appropriate factual showing. For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, when considering an officer’s testimony that a stop occurred in a “high crime area,” the court must identify the relationship between the charged offense and the type of crime the area is known for, the geographic boundaries of the allegedly “high crime area,” and the temporal proximity between the evidence of criminal activity and the observations allegedly giving rise to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007), cited with approval in United States v. Swain, 324 F. App’x. 219, at *222 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (“Reasonable suspicion is a context-driven inquiry and the high-crime-area factor, like most others, can be implicated to varying degrees. For example, an open-air drug market location presents a different situation than a parking lot where an occasional drug deal might occur.”); see also United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[t]he citing of an area as ‘high-crime’ requires careful examination by the court, because such a description, unless properly limited and factually based, can easily serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity”).
Cases finding a stop in a “high-crime” area not to be based on reasonable suspicion include:

*State v. White*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 712 S.E.2d 921, 928 (2011) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where officers responded to a complaint of loud music in a location they regarded as a high crime area but officers did not see the defendant engaged in any suspicious activity and did not see any device capable of producing loud music; that the defendant was running in the neighborhood did not establish reasonable suspicion; “[t]o conclude the officers were justified in effectuating an investigatory stop, on these facts, would render any person who is unfortunate enough to live in a high-crime area subject to an investigatory stop merely for the act of running”)

*State v. Hayes*, 188 N.C. App. 313 (2008) (reasonable suspicion did not exist where defendant and another man were in area where drug-related arrests had been made in past, they were walking back and forth on a sidewalk in a residential neighborhood on a Sunday afternoon, the officer did not believe they lived in the neighborhood, and the officer observed in the car they had exited a gun under the seat of the defendant’s companion but not of the defendant)

Cases finding a stop in a “high-crime” area to be justified by additional factors showing reasonable suspicion include:

*State v. Butler*, 331 N.C. 227 (1992) (presence of an individual on a corner specifically known for drug activity and the scene of multiple recent arrests for drugs, coupled with evasive actions by defendant, were sufficient to form reasonable suspicion to stop)

*State v. Mello*, 200 N.C. App. 437 (2009) (holding that the defendant’s presence in a high-drug area, coupled with evasive action on the part of individuals seen interacting with defendant, provided reasonable suspicion to support a stop), aff’d per curiam, 364 N.C. 421 (2010)

*In re I.R.T.*, 184 N.C. App. 579 (2007) (discussing factors relevant to whether an officer had reasonable suspicion)

**C. Proximity to Crime Scenes or Crime Suspects**

A factor similar to presence in a high-crime area, discussed in subsection B., above, is proximity to a crime scene. Without more, this factor does not establish reasonable suspicion. See *State v. Brown*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 720 S.E.2d 446 (2011) (proximity to area in which robbery occurred four hours earlier insufficient to justify stop); *State v. Chlopek*, 209 N.C. App. 358 (2011) (no reasonable suspicion to stop truck that drove into subdivision under construction and drove out thirty minutes later at a time of night when copper thefts had been reported in other parts of the county); *State v. Murray*, 192 N.C. App. 684 (2008) (officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle when officer was on patrol at 4:00 a.m. in area where there had been recent break-ins; vehicle was not breaking any traffic laws, officer did not see any indication of any damage or break-in
that night, vehicle was on public street and was not leaving parking lot of any business, and officer found no irregularities on check of vehicle’s license plate); *State v. Cooper*, 186 N.C. App. 100 (2007) (no reasonable suspicion where defendant, a black male, was in vicinity of crime scene and suspect was described as a black male); *compare State v. Campbell*, 188 N.C. App. 701 (2008) (court states that proximity to crime scene, time of day, and absence of other suspects in vicinity do not, by themselves, establish reasonable suspicion; however, noting other factors, court finds that reasonable suspicion existed in all the circumstances of the case).

Likewise, proximity to a person suspected of a crime or wanted for arrest, without more, does not establish reasonable suspicion. See *State v. Washington*, 193 N.C. App. 670 (2008) (defendant drove to and entered home of person who was wanted for several felonies; defendant and person came out of house a few minutes later and drove to nearby gas station, parked in lot, and got out of car, where officers arrested other person and ordered defendant to stop; trial court’s finding that officer had right to make investigative stop of defendant because he transported wanted person was erroneous as matter of law).

D. Flight

**Generally.** In *Illinois v. Wardlow*, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant’s headlong flight on seeing the officers, along with his presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking, constituted reasonable suspicion to stop. The Court reaffirmed that mere presence in a high drug area does not constitute reasonable suspicion and cautioned that reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances, not any single factor. See also *In re J.L.B.M.*, 176 N.C. App. 613 (2006) (officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop in following circumstances: officer received police dispatch of suspicious person, described as Hispanic male, at gas station; when officer drove up, he saw a Hispanic male in baggy clothes, who spoke to someone in another car and then walked away from location of officer’s patrol car).

**Flight from consensual or illegal encounter not RDO.** If an officer has grounds to seize a person, the person’s flight may constitute resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer in the lawful performance of his or her duties (RDO). See, e.g., *State v. Lynch*, 94 N.C. App. 330 (1989). If the initial encounter between an officer and defendant is consensual and not a seizure, however, a defendant’s attempt to leave would not constitute RDO. See, e.g., *State v. Joe*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 730 S.E.2d 779 (2012), review granted, ___ N.C. ___, 736 S.E.2d 187 (2013); *State v. White*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 712 S.E.2d 921, 927–28 (2011) (so holding); *In re A.J. M.-B.*, 212 N.C. App. 586 (2011) (same); *State v. Sinclair*, 191 N.C. App. 485, 490–91 (2008) (“Although Defendant’s subsequent flight may have contributed to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot thereby justifying an investigatory stop, Defendant’s flight from a consensual encounter cannot be used as evidence that Defendant was resisting, delaying, or obstructing [the officer] in the performance of his duties.”); *compare State v. Washington*, 193 N.C. App. 670 (2008) (officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, so defendant’s flight constituted RDO). For a discussion of the difference between consensual encounters and seizures, see *supra* § 15.2A, Consensual Encounters.
Likewise, if an officer illegally stops a person, the person’s attempt to leave thereafter ordinarily would not give the officer grounds to stop the person and charge him or her with RDO. See, e.g., White, ___ N.C. App. ___, 712 S.E.2d 921 (if officer is attempting to effect unlawful stop, defendant’s flight is not RDO because officer is not discharging a lawful duty); Sinclair, 191 N.C. App. 485 (same); State v. Swift, 105 N.C. App. 550 (1992) (recognizing that person may flee illegal stop or arrest); JOHN RUBIN, THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE IN NORTH CAROLINA 137–38 (UNC Institute of Government, 1996) (person has limited right to resist illegal stop). But cf. State v. Branch, 194 N.C. App. 173 (2008) (officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant but did not have grounds to continue detention after completing purpose of stop; defendant had right to resist continued detention but used more force than reasonably necessary by driving away while officer was reaching into vehicle; officer therefore had probable cause to arrest defendant for assault); In re J.L.B.M., 176 N.C. App. 613 (2006) (juvenile could be adjudicated delinquent of obstructing officer for giving false name to officer during illegal stop).

E. Traffic Stops

**Standard for making stop.** An officer may not randomly stop motorists to check their driver’s license or vehicle registration; an officer must have at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Police may establish systematic checkpoints, without individualized suspicion, under certain conditions. See infra § 15.3J, Motor Vehicle Checkpoints.

The N.C. Court of Appeals previously held in several opinions that when an officer makes a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation, such as speeding or running a red light, the stop had to be supported by probable cause. In contrast, according to these decisions, reasonable suspicion was sufficient if the suspected violation was one that could be verified only by stopping the vehicle, such as impaired driving or driving with a revoked license. See State v. Baublitz, 172 N.C. App. 801 (2005) and cases cited therein; see also State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 (2006) (suggested under U.S. and N.C. constitutions that probable cause may be required to stop for any traffic violation). The N.C. Supreme Court has since held that reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is sufficient for a traffic stop, regardless of whether the traffic violation is readily observed or merely suspected. See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412 (2008). But cf. G.S. 15A-1113(b) (an officer who has probable cause of a noncriminal infraction may detain the person to issue and serve a citation); State v. Day, 168 P.3d 1265 (Wash. 2007) (officer may not make investigatory stop for parking violation); State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1997) (to same effect).

**Standing of passenger to challenge stop.** In Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a passenger in a car is seized under the Fourth Amendment when the police make a traffic stop, and the passenger may challenge the stop’s constitutionality. Accord State v. Canty, ___ N.C. App. ___, 736 S.E.2d 532 (2012). Consequently, when evidence incriminating a passenger is obtained following an illegal stop, the passenger has standing to move to suppress the evidence. This ruling
overrules any contrary authority in North Carolina. See State v. Smith, 117 N.C. App. 671 (1995) (suggesting that a passenger did not have standing to move to suppress). The North Carolina Court of Appeals has recognized under Brendlin that a passenger also has standing to challenge the duration of a stop. See State v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236 (2009).

If a stop is valid, a passenger’s standing to challenge actions taken during the stop (such as frisks or searches) will depend on whether the officer’s actions infringe on the passenger’s rights. See State v. Franklin, ___ N.C. App. ___, 736 S.E.2d 218 (2012) (although a passenger who has no possessor interest in a vehicle has standing to challenge a stop of the vehicle, that passenger does not have standing to challenge a search of the vehicle).

F. Selected Reasons for Traffic Stops

Delay at light. Compare, e.g., State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244 (2008) (driver’s unexplained thirty-second delay before proceeding through green traffic light gave rise to reasonable suspicion of impaired driving in all the circumstances), with State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129 (2004) (defendant’s eight to ten second delay after light turned green did not give officer reasonable suspicion to stop for impaired driving).

Failure to use turn signal. Compare, e.g., State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 (2006) (failure to use turn signal when making turn did not give officer grounds to stop; failure to signal did not affect operation of any other vehicle or any pedestrian), and State v. Watkins, ___ N.C. App. ___, 725 S.E.2d 400 (2012) (suggesting that unsigned lane change was insufficient to justify stop), with State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412 (2008) (failure to use turn signal gave officer grounds to stop because failure could affect operation of another vehicle, in this case vehicle driven by officer, which was directly behind defendant), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C. App. 319 (2010) (similar).

Speeding or slowing. See, e.g., State v. Canty, ___ N.C. App. ___, 736 S.E.2d 532 (2012) (no reasonable suspicion; car touched fog line and slowed to 59 m.p.h. in 65 m.p.h. when officers passed car, and driver and passengers appeared nervous and failed to make eye contact with passing officer); State v. Royster, ___ N.C. App. ___, 737 S.E.2d 400 (2012) (officer had sufficient time to form opinion that defendant was speeding); State v. Barnhill, 166 N.C. App. 228 (2004) (officer’s estimate that defendant was going 40 m.p.h. in 25 m.p.h. zone justified stop); State v. Aubin, 100 N.C. App. 628 (1990) (driving excessively slowly and weaving in own lane justified stop); see also Welty, Traffic Stops, at 3 (noting that “if a vehicle is speeding only slightly, an officer’s visual estimate of speed may be insufficiently reliable and accurate to support a traffic stop”; citing cases), available at http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2013-03-Traffic-Stops.pdf.

Weaving. Numerous cases address “weaving” in one’s own lane. While weaving is not a traffic violation and alone may not provide reasonable suspicion, it may provide reasonable suspicion to stop when combined with other factors or when severe. See also Jeff Welty, Weaving and Reasonable Suspicion, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T
Cases not finding grounds for a stop include: *State v. Canty*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 736 S.E.2d 532 (2012) (no reasonable suspicion; car touched fog line and slowed to 59 m.p.h. in 65 m.p.h. when officers passed car and driver and passengers appeared nervous and failed to make eye contact with passing officer); *State v. Peele*, 196 N.C. App. 668 (2009) (single instance of weaving in own lane, without more, did not constitute reasonable suspicion to stop; officer’s reliance on dispatcher’s report of impaired driving in the area, in addition to officer’s observation of weaving, did not provide reasonable suspicion; dispatcher’s report was treated as based on anonymous tip, as State provided no evidence that report of bad driving came from identified caller); *State v. Fields*, 195 N.C. App. 740 (2009) (weaving in own lane three times, without more, did not establish reasonable suspicion to stop for impaired driving; defendant violated no other traffic laws, was driving at 4:00 p.m. in afternoon, which was not unusual hour, and was not near places that furnished alcohol); see also *State v. Tarvin*, 972 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App. 1998) (trial court granted motion to suppress, observing that driving a car, in and of itself, is “controlled weaving”; appellate court upholds suppression of stop).

Cases finding grounds for a stop include: *State v. Kochuk*, ___ N.C. ___, 742 S.E.2d 801 (2013), rev’d per curiam for reasons stated in dissenting opinion, ___ N.C. App. ___, 741 S.E.2d 327 (2012); *State v. Otto*, 366 N.C. 134 (2012) (traffic stop justified by the defendant’s “constant and continual” weaving for three quarters of a mile at 11:00 p.m. on Friday night); *State v. Fields*, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 723 S.E.2d 777, 778 (2012) (officer followed defendant for three quarters of a mile and saw him “weaving in his own lane . . . sufficiently frequent[ly] and erratic[ally] to prompt evasive maneuvers from other drivers”); *State v. Simmons*, 205 N.C. App. 509, 525 (2010) (stop was supported by reasonable suspicion where the defendant “was not only weaving within his lane, but was also weaving across and outside the lanes of travel, and at one point actually ran off the road”); *State v. Jacobs*, 162 N.C. App. 251, 255 (2004) (court recognizes that “defendant’s weaving within his lane was not a crime,” but finds that all of the facts—slowly weaving within own lane for three-quarters of a mile, late at night, in area near bars—justified stop); *State v. Thompson*, 154 N.C. App. 194 (2002) (weaving within the lane and touching the centerline with both left tires, combined with speeding and other factors, justified stop); *State v. Watson*, 122 N.C. App. 596 (1996) (driving on center line and weaving in own lane at 2:30 a.m. near nightclub justified stop); *State v. Aubin*, 100 N.C. App. 628 (1990) (driving excessively slowly and weaving in own lane justified stop); see also *State v. Hudson*, 206 N.C. App. 482 (2010) (crossing center line and fog line twice provided probable cause for stop for violation of G.S. 20-146(a), which requires driving on right side of highway).

**Proximity to bars.** See, e.g., *State v. Roberson*, 163 N.C. App. 129 (2004) (driving at 4:30 a.m. in area with several bars and restaurants did not increase level of suspicion and justify stop; by law, those establishments must stop serving alcohol at 2:00 a.m.); *State v. Watson*, 122 N.C. App. 596 (1996) (proximity to nightclub at 2:30 a.m., combined with driving on center line and weaving in own lane, justified stop).
Anonymous tip of impaired driving. See infra § 15.3G, Anonymous Tips.

Ownership and registration. See, e.g., State v. Burke, 212 N.C. App. 654 (2011) (stop based merely on low number of temporary tag not supported by reasonable suspicion), aff’d per curiam, 365 N.C. 415 (2012); State v. Hess, 185 N.C. App. 530 (2007) (owner of car had suspended license; absent evidence that owner was not driving car, officer had reasonable suspicion to stop car to determine whether owner was driving); State v. Hudson, 103 N.C. App. 708 (1991) (officer had reasonable suspicion that faded, temporary registration had expired and that vehicle was improperly registered); see also United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 2000) (Fourth Amendment does not allow traffic stop simply because vehicle had temporary tags and officer could not read expiration date while driving behind defendant at night).

For a discussion of limitations on an officer’s actions after discovering that a car was not improperly registered, see infra § 15.3L, Mistaken Belief by Officer.

Seatbelt violations. See, e.g., State v. Villeda, 165 N.C. App. 431 (2004) (trooper did not have grounds to stop defendant for seat belt violation; evidence indicated that trooper could not see inside vehicles driving in front of him at night on stretch of road on which defendant was stopped).

G. Anonymous Tips

General test. Information from informants is evaluated under the “totality of the circumstances,” but the most critical factors are the reliability of the informant and the basis of the informant’s knowledge. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).

When a tip is anonymous, the reliability of the informant is difficult to assess, and the tip is insufficient to justify a stop unless the tip itself contains strong indicia of reliability or independent police work corroborates significant details of the tip. See State v. Johnson, 204 N.C. App. 259, 260–61 (2010) (finding tip insufficient under these principles; anonymous caller merely alleged that black male wearing a white shirt in a blue Mitsubishi with a certain license plate number was selling guns and drugs at certain street corner); see also State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437 (1994) (upholding stop based on corroboration), rev’g 111 N.C. App. 766 (1993); State v. Harwood, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 727 S.E.2d 891, 899 (2012) (uncorroborated, anonymous tip did not provide basis for stop; “tip in question simply provided that Defendant would be selling marijuana at a certain location on a certain day and would be driving a white vehicle”); State v. Peele, 196 N.C. App. 668 (2009) (officer’s reliance on dispatcher’s report of impaired driving in the area along with observation of single instance of weaving did not provide reasonable suspicion; dispatcher’s report was treated as based on anonymous tip, as State provided no evidence that report of bad driving came from identified caller); see also State v. Coleman, ___ N.C. App. ___, 743 S.E.2d 62 (2013) (even though caller gave her name, court concluded that information that defendant had open container of alcohol was no more reliable than information provided by anonymous tipster; caller did not identify or describe the defendant, did not provide any way for the officer to assess her credibility,
failed to explain the basis of her knowledge, and did not include any information concerning defendant’s future actions).

A tip from a person whom the police fail to identify might not be considered anonymous, or at least not completely anonymous, if the tipster has put his or her anonymity sufficiently at risk. See State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614 (2008) (driver who approached officers in person to report erratic driving was not completely anonymous informant even though officers did not take the time to get her name; also, informant had little time to fabricate allegations); State v. Allen, 197 N.C. App. 208 (2009) (tip was not anonymous; victim had face-to-face encounter with police when reporting alleged assault); State v. Hudgins, 195 N.C. App. 430 (2009) (caller, although not identified, placed his anonymity at risk; he remained on his cell phone with the dispatcher for eight minutes, gave detailed information about the person who was following him, followed the dispatcher’s instructions, which allowed an officer to intercept the person who was following the caller, and remained at scene long enough to identify person stopped by the officer).

**Weapons offenses.** In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), the Court found that an anonymous tip—stating that a young black male was at a particular bus stop wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun—did not give officers reasonable suspicion to stop. The tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and provided no predictive information about the person’s conduct. The Court refused to adopt a “firearm exception,” under which a tip alleging possession of an illegal firearm would justify a stop and frisk even if the tip fails the standard test for reasonable suspicion. See also State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200 (2000) (following Florida v. J.L., court finds anonymous tip insufficient to support stop); State v. Brown, 142 N.C. App. 332 (2001) (to same effect).

**Impaired driving cases.** Florida v. J.L. indicates that the standard for evaluating anonymous tips should be the same regardless of the type of offense involved, with possible exceptions for certain offenses (such as offenses involving explosives).

In cases in North Carolina in which the police have received a tip about impaired or erratic driving, the courts have applied the same standard for assessing reasonable suspicion as in cases involving other offenses. They have not recognized an exception for impaired driving. See State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614 (2008) (finding in totality of circumstances that tip about erratic driving and other information gave officers reasonable suspicion to stop); State v. Peele, 196 N.C. App. 668 (2009) (following Maready, court finds that tip about erratic driving and other information did not give officers reasonable suspicion to stop). However, a tip might not be treated as completely anonymous if the tipster placed his or her anonymity sufficiently at risk. See supra “General test” in this subsection G.

**Drug cases.** An anonymous tip to police that a person is involved in illegal drug sales is not sufficient, without more, to justify an investigatory stop. See State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209 (2003) (anonymous tip that drugs were being sold from particular vehicle was not sufficient to justify stop of vehicle); compare State v. Sutton, 167 N.C. App. 242 (2004) (tip from pharmacist with whom officer had been working on ongoing basis to
uncover illegal activity involving prescriptions, combined with officer’s own observations, provided reasonable suspicion to stop defendant after defendant left pharmacy).

H. Information from Other Officers

Generally. An officer may stop a person based on the request of another officer if:

- the officer making the stop has reasonable suspicion for the stop based on his or her personal observations;
- the officer making the stop received a request to stop the defendant from another officer who, before making the request, had reasonable suspicion for the stop; or
- the officer making the stop received information from another officer before the stop, which when combined with the stopping officer’s observations constituted reasonable suspicion.

See State v. Battle, 109 N.C. App. 367, 371 (1993) (discussing general standard for stops based on collective knowledge); State v. Bowman, 193 N.C. App. 104 (2008) (collective knowledge of team of officers investigating defendant imputed to officer who conducted search of vehicle); State v. Watkins, 120 N.C. App. 804 (1995) (information fabricated by one officer and supplied to stopping officer may not be used to show reasonable suspicion, even if stopping officer did not know that the information was fabricated); see also State v. Harwood, ___ N.C. App. ___, 727 S.E.2d 891 (2012) (anonymous tip did not provide basis for stop; court appears to reject argument that officers could rely on outstanding arrest warrant unknown to stopping officers when they stopped defendant); Jeff Welty, Fascinating Footnote 3, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Aug. 13, 2012) (discussing Harwood), http://nc crim inallaw.sog.unc.edu/? p=3815.

Police broadcasts. Police broadcasts may or may not be based on an officer’s observations. Without any showing as to the basis of the broadcast, it should be given no more weight than an anonymous tip. See State v. Peele, 196 N.C. App. 668 (2009) (dispatcher’s report of impaired driving was treated as based on anonymous tip, as State provided no evidence that report of driving came from identified caller); see also supra § 15.3G, Anonymous Tips.

I. Pretext

In some instances, a court may find that a stop or search is unconstitutional because the purported justification for the stop or search is a pretext for an impermissible reason.

Stops based on individualized suspicion. The U.S. Supreme Court has significantly cut back the pretext doctrine. Generally, an officer’s subjective motivation in stopping a person or vehicle is irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has probable cause to make the stop. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court held that an officer’s actual motivation in making a stop (for example, to investigate for drugs) is generally irrelevant if the officer has probable cause for the stop and could have

Whren did not specifically address whether a defendant may challenge as pretextual a stop based on reasonable suspicion. See also Hamilton, 125 N.C. App. 396 (dissent notes that Whren left this question open). It seems unlikely, however, that Whren would not apply to circumstances in which officers have reasonable suspicion to stop, a lesser degree of proof than probable cause but still a form of individualized suspicion. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (in upholding validity of material-witness arrest warrant requiring less than probable cause for issuance, Court states that subjective intent is pertinent only in cases not involving individualized suspicion).

Facts known to officer. Whren and cases following it consider the objective facts supporting a stop. Consequently, if the facts known to an officer amount to a violation of the law, the stop is valid even though the officer may have made the stop for a different reason. See State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244 (2008) (based on defendant’s thirty-second delay after traffic light turned green, officer stopped defendant for impaired driving, for which there was reasonable suspicion, and for impeding traffic, which was not a traffic violation; court upholds stop, reasoning that its constitutionality depends on the objective facts observed by officer, not the officer’s subjective motivation); State v. Osterhoudt, ___ N.C. App. ___, 731 S.E.2d 454 (2012) (trooper had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant based on observed traffic violations notwithstanding his mistaken belief that defendant violated different traffic law).

Relatedly, facts unknown to the officer at the time of the stop do not provide a basis for a stop. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[w]hether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest”; officer’s subjective reason for making arrest need not be criminal offense as to which known facts provide probable cause); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(d), at 57–58 (for actions without warrant, information to be considered is totality of facts available to officer). For a discussion of reliance on the collective knowledge of the investigating officers, see supra § 15.3H, Information from Other Officers.

Accordingly, if the facts known to an officer do not satisfy the State’s burden of showing grounds for the stop, the stop is invalid. This result does not depend on whether the stop was or was not pretextual, although as a practical matter judges may scrutinize more
closely whether grounds existed for the stop if they believe an officer acted for a pretextual reason. See infra § 15.3M, Race Based Stops (discussing cases); see also State v. Franklin, ___ N.C. App. ___, 736 S.E.2d 218 (2013) (Elmore, J., dissenting) (finding that evidence failed to show that officer observed seat belt violation and therefore failed to show officer possessed probable cause for stop).

Exceptions. There are some limits to Whren.

- **Whren** itself stated that a defendant may challenge as pretextual inventory searches or administrative inspections because they are not based on individualized suspicion.
- Likewise, a defendant may challenge as pretextual a license or other checkpoint when the real purpose is impermissible. See infra “Pretextual checkpoints” in § 15.3J, Motor Vehicle Checkpoints.
- A stop for a traffic violation or other matter still violates the Fourth Amendment if the officer exceeds the scope of the stop—for example, the officer unduly detains the defendant about a matter unrelated to the purpose of the stop without additional grounds to do so. See infra § 15.4E, Nature, Length, and Purpose of Detention.
- If an officer stops a defendant because of his or her race, the stop may violate equal protection regardless of whether probable cause exists. See supra § 15.2C, Race-Based “Consensual” Encounters. Or, the racial motivation may undermine the credibility of the officer’s stated reason for the stop. See infra § 15.3M, Race-Based Stops.

**Effect of not issuing citation.** The failure of an officer to issue a citation for the traffic violation that was the basis of a traffic stop does not affect the stop’s validity if objective circumstances indicate that the defendant committed a violation. See State v. Baublitz, 172 N.C. App. 801 (2005) (officer’s “objective observation” that defendant’s vehicle twice crossed center line of highway provided officer with probable cause to stop for traffic violation, regardless of officer’s subjective motivation for making stop; court finds it irrelevant that officer did not issue traffic ticket to defendant after arresting him for possession of cocaine).

Nevertheless, a stop would be unlawful if the circumstances indicate that the officer did not have grounds for the stop—for example, the officer could not have observed the alleged traffic or other violation. See State v. Villeda, 165 N.C. App. 431 (2004) (trooper did not have probable cause to stop defendant for seat belt violation; evidence indicated that trooper could not see inside vehicles driving in front of him at night on stretch of road on which defendant was stopped). The failure to issue a citation, along with other factors, may bear on the credibility of the officer’s claimed observation of a violation. See State v. Parker, 183 N.C. App. 1, 8 (2007) (noting rule in Baublitz that failure to issue citation for violation that was basis of stop does not affect validity of stop if objective circumstances support stop, but also noting holding in Villeda that evidence may not support officer’s claimed observations).
J. Motor Vehicle Checkpoints

The discussion below reviews selected principles governing motor vehicle checkpoints. For an in-depth discussion of checkpoints as well as additional information on some of the issues discussed below, see Welty, Motor Vehicle Checkpoints, available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb1004.pdf.

License and registration checkpoints. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court held that officers may not randomly stop motorists to check their driver’s license or vehicle registration; the Court indicated, however, that checkpoints at which drivers’ licenses and registrations are systematically checked may be permissible. See also State v. Sanders, 112 N.C. App. 477 (1993) (upholding license checkpoint under authority of Prouse). Motor vehicle checkpoints are authorized in North Carolina under G.S. 20-16.3A, which allows checkpoints for the purpose of determining compliance with G.S. Chapter 20. The N.C. Court of Appeals has questioned whether it is constitutionally permissible to set up a checkpoint to check for “any and all” motor vehicle violations; subsequent decisions have not specifically addressed the question. State v. Veazey, 191 N.C. App. 181, 189 (2008) (questioning whether it is constitutionally permissible to set up a checkpoint to check for “any and all” motor vehicle violations), appeal after remand, 201 N.C. App. 398 (2009) (finding that checkpoint was for lawful purpose of checking licenses and that checkpoint was tailored to that purpose); see also 5 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.8(b), at 420–22 (suggesting that vehicle safety checkpoints may be permissible if they do not involve unrestrained discretion and are not a subterfuge for other purposes). But cf. infra § 15.3K, Drug and Other Checkpoints (noting disapproval of general crime control checkpoints).

A license and registration checkpoint must comply with both constitutional limitations and the procedures in G.S. 20-16.3A. For a further discussion of these limitations, see Welty, Motor Vehicle Checkpoints, available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb1004.pdf.

DWI checkpoints. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of impaired-driving checkpoints conducted under guidelines regulating officers’ discretion. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). Impaired-driving checkpoints in North Carolina must comply with both constitutional limitations and the procedures in G.S. 20-16.3A. For a further discussion of these limitations, see Welty, Motor Vehicle Checkpoints.

Pretextual checkpoints. A license or impaired-driving checkpoint is subject to challenge as pretextual under the Fourth Amendment. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (checkpoint is unconstitutional if primary purpose is unlawful; checkpoint was unlawful in this case because primary purpose was to investigate for drugs).

Avoiding checkpoint. In State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627 (2000), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that avoidance of a lawful checkpoint constituted reasonable suspicion to stop to inquire why the defendant turned away from the checkpoint. Cases since Foreman have looked at the totality of the circumstances, implicitly recognizing
that turning away from a checkpoint may not always constitute reasonable suspicion to stop. See State v. Griffin, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2013) (defendant made three-point turn in middle of road, not at intersection, to avoid checkpoint where police lights were visible; court states that “even a legal turn, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, may give rise to reasonable suspicion” and finds that “place and manner of defendant’s turn in conjunction with his proximity to the checkpoint” provided reasonable suspicion to stop); White v. Tippett, 187 N.C. App. 285 (2007) (from a combination of the driver’s evasion of the checkpoint, odor of alcohol surrounding the driver, and brief conversation with the driver, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver had committed an implied-consent offense); State v. Bowden, 177 N.C. App. 718 (2006) (defendant broke hard before checkpoint, causing front of car to dip, abruptly turned into parking lot, pulled in and out of parking space, headed toward exit, and pulled into another space when officer drove up; totality of circumstances justified officer in pursuing and stopping defendant’s car).

**Challenge to illegal checkpoint by person who turns away.** The N.C. Court of Appeals has held that the illegality of a checkpoint is not relevant when a driver turns away from the checkpoint because the checkpoint is not the basis for the stop in those circumstances. See State v. Collins, ___ N.C. App. ___, 724 S.E.2d 82 (2012); see also White v. Tippett, 187 N.C. App. 285 (2007) (so stating in civil license proceedings). (These decisions are inconsistent with the decision of another panel of the court of appeals, but the decision of that panel was vacated and remanded for other reasons. See State v. Haislip, 186 N.C. App. 275 (2007) (if checkpoint is unconstitutional, turning away from checkpoint would not be grounds to stop defendant), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 362 N.C. 499 (2008) (remanded to trial court for written findings of fact and conclusions of law).)

The above principle does not necessarily end the inquiry. In remanding the case for further findings, the court in Collins recognized that an officer must have reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant who turns away from an unconstitutional checkpoint; mere turning away may not be sufficient. See also State v. Griffin, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2013) (stating that court did not need to address alleged unconstitutionality of checkpoint because in circumstances of case officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant). Also at play is the principle that a person has the right to avoid an illegal action. Turning away from an illegal checkpoint, along with other factors, may provide reasonable suspicion, just as running on foot from an unlawful stop, along with other factors, may provide reasonable suspicion. Without more, however, merely failing to obey an unlawful action by the police may not constitute reasonable suspicion. See supra § 15.3D, Flight; see also Jeff Welty, Ruse Checkpoints, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (June 1, 2011) (citing cases holding that a person’s avoidance of a “ruse” checkpoint—that is, one in which officers put up signs warning of a checkpoint ahead that does not actually exist or that is illegal so that officers may observe drivers’ reactions—does not without more provide reasonable suspicion to stop), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=2516.

**Limits on detention at checkpoint.** Although motorists may be briefly stopped at an impaired driving checkpoint, detention of a particular motorist for more extensive
investigation, such as field sobriety testing, requires satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990). For a further discussion of these issues, see Welty, Motor Vehicle Checkpoints, at 6–7 (questions 10 and 11), available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb1004.pdf.

K. Drug and Other Checkpoints


Information-seeking checkpoints. Distinguishing Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, which found drug checkpoints unconstitutional, the Court held that brief stops of motorists at a highway checkpoint at which police sought information about a recent fatal hit-and-run accident on that highway were not presumptively invalid under the Fourth Amendment. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

Public housing checkpoints. See State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505 (Tenn. 2006) (identification checkpoint at entrance to public housing development violated Fourth Amendment where goal was to reduce crime, exclude trespassers, and enforce lease agreement provisions to decrease crime and drug use; checkpoint was aimed at general crime control); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 540 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (drug checkpoint inside entrance to public housing project unconstitutional).

L. Mistaken Belief by Officer

A mistaken belief by an officer may or may not justify a stop depending on the nature of the belief. If a mistake of “law,” the mistake generally does not justify a stop; if a mistake of “fact,” the mistake may not invalidate the stop. Distinguishing between a mistake of law and mistake of fact may be difficult in some cases.

Mistake of law. Generally, a stop based on observed facts that do not amount to a violation of the law—a mistake of “law”—violates the Fourth Amendment. See State v. McLamb, 186 N.C. App. 124 (2007) (officer stopped defendant for speeding for going 30 m.p.h. in what the officer thought was a 20 m.p.h. zone; speed limit was actually 55 m.p.h., and stop violated Fourth Amendment); State v. Schiffer, 132 N.C. App. 22 (1999) (officer was mistaken in believing that out-of-state vehicle was subject to North Carolina’s window-tinting restrictions; however, officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for violation of North Carolina’s windshield-tinting restrictions, which do apply to out-of-state vehicles); see also State v. Hopper, 205 N.C. App. 175, 182–83 (2010) (upholding trial court’s finding that defendant was driving on public street and therefore was subject to traffic laws; therefore, case was distinguishable “from the line of decisions holding that a law enforcement officer’s mistaken belief that a defendant had committed a traffic violation is constitutionally insufficient to support a traffic stop” [this opinion supersedes the court of appeals’ prior opinion in this case, which was withdrawn, discussing whether the officer made a mistake of law or fact about whether the defendant
was on a public street]); cf. State v. Osterhoudt, ___ N.C. App. ___, 731 S.E.2d 454 (2012) (trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle based on observed traffic violations even where trooper was mistaken about which motor vehicle statute had been violated).

In a 4 to 3 decision, the N.C. Supreme Court recognized an exception to the rule that a mistake of law will not support a stop. The Court held that if an officer makes a stop based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law, the stop is not invalid because of the mistake. See State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271 (2012) (holding that although law requires vehicle to have only one working brake light, stop by officer based on mistaken belief that vehicles must have two working brake lights was objectively reasonable). This decision may have a limited impact. The court in Heien noted that North Carolina’s brake light requirements were particularly ambiguous and, until this case, had not been interpreted by the appellate courts. In cases in which the legal requirements are clearer or more established, an officer’s mistake would not meet the standard announced in Heien. See State v. Coleman, ___ N.C. App. ___, 743 S.E.2d 62 (2013) (finding that mistake of law about lawfulness of possession of open container of alcohol in public vehicular area was not reasonable).

The dissenters in Heien argued that the majority’s decision is inconsistent with North Carolina cases refusing to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in search warrant cases and other instances in which the police rely on official records. The majority did not overrule or question that line of cases, however. See supra “Good faith exception for constitutional violations not valid in North Carolina” in § 14.2B, Search Warrants (discussing case law and impact of recent legislation).

**Mistake of fact.** A stop based on an officer’s incorrect assessment of the facts—that is, a mistake of fact—does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer’s mistake was reasonable. See State v. Smith, 192 N.C. App. 690 (2008) (so holding); see also State v. Williams, 209 N.C. App. 255 (2011) (officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle in which defendant was a passenger based on the officers’ good faith belief that the driver had a revoked license and information about the defendant’s drug sales, corroborated by the officers, from three reliable informants; the officer’s mistake about who was driving the vehicle was reasonable under the circumstances).

Once the officer realizes his or her mistake, the officer must terminate the encounter unless he or she has developed additional reasonable suspicion for the stop. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2003) (once officer determined that temporary license tag on defendant’s automobile was valid, any further detention violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); McGaughey v. State, 37 P.3d 130 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (although initial stop of truck was permissible based on officer’s belief that truck’s taillights were not working, officer could not continue to detain truck once officer saw that both taillights were working); State v. Lopez, 631 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (officer, who stopped car for having no license plates but then discovered when approaching car that car had lawful temporary sticker, could continue stop long enough to
explain to driver that he was free to go; when officer approached driver, odor of alcohol coming from interior of car provided officer with reasonable suspicion to continue detention and investigate).

M. Race-Based Stops

The North Carolina appellate courts have taken a closer look at stops that may have been motivated by the defendant’s race. Although the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a stop if the objective facts known to the officer justify the stop (see supra “Facts known to officer” in § 15.3I, Pretext), the courts have sometimes found that an officer’s asserted, non-racial basis for the stop was not credible or not sufficient to support the stop. See State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562, 564 (2006) (court states that it could not determine whether stop of car driven by black male was “selective enforcement of the law based upon race,” which would be a violation of equal protection; court states, however, that it “will not tolerate discriminatory application of the law” based on race and finds that officer did not have grounds to stop defendant for failure to use turn signal), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412 (2008); In re J.L.B.M., 176 N.C. App. 613 (2006) (officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop in following circumstances: officer received police dispatch of suspicious person, described as Hispanic male, at gas station; when officer drove up, he saw Hispanic male in baggy clothes, who spoke to someone in another car and then walked away from location of officer’s patrol car); State v. Villeda, 165 N.C. App. 431 (2004) (court reviews at length evidence that trooper’s stop of Hispanic driver was racially motivated; court upholds trial court’s finding that trooper was not able to observe whether driver was wearing seat belt).

A stop based on race also may violate Equal Protection. See supra § 15.2C, Race-Based “Consensual” Encounters.

N. Limits on Officer’s Territorial Jurisdiction

If an officer acts outside his or her territorial jurisdiction, the actions may constitute a substantial statutory violation under G.S. 15A-974 and warrant the exclusion of any evidence discovered. See generally FARB at 14–17, 89–90 (discussing territorial jurisdiction of city officers, campus officers, and others, and cases addressing motions to suppress); G.S. 20-38.2 (“[a] law enforcement officer who is investigating an implied-consent offense or a vehicle crash that occurred in the officer’s territorial jurisdiction is authorized to investigate and seek evidence of the driver’s impairment anywhere in-state or out-of-state, and to make arrests at any place within the State”); cf. Parker v. Hyatt, 196 N.C. App. 489 (2009) (State wildlife officer had authority to make warrantless stop for impaired driving).

A statutory violation by an officer may be excused if based on an objectively reasonable, good faith belief in the lawfulness of the action. See G.S. 15A-974(a); see also supra § 14.5, Substantial Violations of Criminal Procedure Act.
O. Community Caretaking

A detention may be constitutionally permissible if it is reasonably conducted in furtherance of the government agent’s community caretaking function and is “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (defendant, who was police officer and was apparently drunk, was in car accident and was taken to local hospital; permissible for other officers to return to car, which had been towed to garage and left outside on street, to look for and retrieve defendant’s service revolver from car as public safety measure; State v. Maddox, 54 P.3d 464 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (stop of motorist not justified by community caretaking function; evidence did not show that motorist needed assistance); see also G.S. 15A-285 (authorizing non-law-enforcement actions when urgently necessary); State v. Hocutt, 177 N.C. App. 341 (2006) (officers were authorized to take defendant to jail to “sober up” under G.S. 122C-303; defendant was very intoxicated and was staggering, barefoot, dirty, and very scratched up on shoulder of highway in isolated area late at night).

15.4 Did the Officer Act within the Scope of the Seizure?

This part concentrates on the restrictions on an officer’s investigation following a stop of a person based on reasonable suspicion. The same principles generally apply to stops for traffic violations, whether based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (“most traffic stops . . . resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry” (citations omitted)); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (“the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest”); State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 (2008) (“Traffic stops have ‘been historically reviewed under the investigatory detention framework first articulated in Terry.’” (citation omitted)).

A. Frisks for Weapons

Grounds for frisk. An officer who has reasonable suspicion to stop a person does not automatically have the right to frisk the person for weapons. The officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person has a weapon and presents a danger to the officer or others. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Morton, 363 N.C. 737 (2009) (per curiam) (finding frisk permissible for reasons stated in section one of dissenting opinion from court of appeals), rev’g 198 N.C. App. 206 (2009); State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272 (1998) (officer did not have grounds for weapons frisk during traffic stop; defendant’s consent to search of car did not authorize frisk of person); State v. Phifer, ___ N.C. App. ___, 741 S.E.2d 446, 449 (2013) (“nervous pacing of a suspect, temporarily detained by an officer to warn him not to walk in the street,” was insufficient to warrant further detention and frisk for weapons); State v. Rhyne, 124 N.C. App. 84 (1996) (insufficient grounds for weapons frisk; drugs discovered during frisk suppressed); State v. Artis, 123 N.C. App. 114 (1996) (suppressing evidence for same reason); see also United States v.
**Burton**, 228 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2000) (in absence of reasonable suspicion, officer may not frisk person merely because officer feels uneasy for his or her safety).

**Factors.** Circumstances to consider include:

- the nature of the suspected offense,
- a bulge in the person’s clothing,
- observation of an object that appears to be a weapon,
- sudden, unexplained movements by the person,
- failure to remove a hand from a pocket, and
- the person’s prior criminal record and history of dangerousness

**Other protective measures.** Whether officers may take other protective measures in connection with a weapons frisk depends on the circumstances of the case. See *State v. Carrouthers*, __ N.C. App. __, 714 S.E.2d 460 (2011) (handcuffing permissible during stop if special circumstances exist and handcuffing is least intrusive means reasonably necessary to carry out purpose of investigatory stop); *State v. Campbell*, 188 N.C. App. 701 (2008) (handcuffing reasonable in light of previous occasions in which defendant had fled from law enforcement); *State v. Smith*, 150 N.C. App. 317 (lifting of long shirt to expose pants pocket during frisk was reasonable under circumstances), aff’d per curiam, 356 N.C. 605 (2002); *State v. Sanchez*, 147 N.C. App. 619 (2001) (multiple occupants of vehicle were briefly handcuffed while officers frisked for weapons and then handcuffs were removed; handcuffing did not exceed scope of stop and convert stop into arrest); see also *State v. Gay*, 748 N.W.2d 408 (N.D. 2008) (although officer had reasonable grounds to handcuff defendant initially, officer acted unreasonably by failing to remove handcuffs once frisk revealed no weapons and the officer’s concerns were dissipated; evidence discovered thereafter was subject to suppression); *People v. Delaware*, 731 N.E.2d 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stop was converted into arrest, requiring probable cause, when officers kept defendant handcuffed after patdown search revealed no weapons).

If protective measures are excessive, the stop may become a de facto arrest, for which probable cause is required. See *Carrouthers*, __ N.C. App. at __, 714 S.E.2d at 464 (so stating). If probable cause does not exist, evidence discovered following a de facto arrest is subject to suppression.

An officer likely does not have the authority to direct a suspect to empty his or her pockets as part of the officer’s authority to frisk or take other protective action during a stop. See *In re V.C.R.*, __ N.C. App. __, 742 S.E.2d 566 (2013) (directing juvenile to empty pockets was unlawful, nonconsensual search); Jeff Welty, *Empty Your Pockets*, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Sept. 29, 2011), [http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=2924](http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=2924). A frisk during a consensual encounter likewise would be unauthorized in most circumstances. See Jeff Welty, *Terry Frisk During a Consensual Encounter?*, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Dec. 22, 2009), [http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=937](http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=937).
B. Vehicles

Ordering driver to exit vehicle. On a stop based on reasonable suspicion, an officer may require the driver to exit the vehicle without specifically showing that requiring such an action was necessary for the officer’s protection. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); see generally 5 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.8(d), at 450–51 (in context of impaired-driving checkpoints, there is not automatically a need for self-protective measures and therefore an officer may not order a motorist out of a vehicle at such a checkpoint either as a matter of routine or on a hunch); Jeff Welty, Traffic Stops, Part II, N.C. Crim. L., UNC Sch. of Gov’t Blog (Oct. 28, 2009) (questioning whether officer may routinely require occupant of vehicle to sit in patrol car during stop), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=811.

Ordering passengers to exit or remain in vehicle; frisking of passengers. Under earlier decisions, officers could require passengers to exit the vehicle only if the officers had grounds to do so. See State v. Hudson, 103 N.C. App. 708 (1991) (officer had reasonable belief that passenger might be armed); State v. Adkerson, 90 N.C. App. 333 (1988) (officer arrested defendant for driving while impaired and had right to require passenger to exit vehicle so officer could search vehicle incident to arrest of driver). In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), the Court held that an officer making a traffic stop may order the passengers out of the car, without specific grounds, pending completion of the stop. Compare Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108 (Mass. 1999) (based on state constitution, court rejects rule that officer may automatically order driver or passenger to exit vehicle).

The Court in Maryland v. Wilson expressed no opinion on whether an officer may automatically detain a passenger during the duration of the stop. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415 n.3. In Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), the Court indicated that officers may detain passengers to frisk them if they reasonably believe the passengers are armed and dangerous, observing that officers are not constitutionally obligated to allow a passenger to depart without first ensuring that they are not “permitting a dangerous person to get behind” them. Id. at 334; see also Owens v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2155 (2009) (court summarily vacates state court decision authorizing automatic pat down of passengers when officers arrest a vehicle occupant and are preparing to conduct search incident to arrest; case remanded). Relatedly, officers may order a passenger to remain temporarily in the vehicle for safety reasons. State v. Shearin, 170 N.C. App. 222 (2005) (majority finds that officer had grounds to order passenger to remain temporarily inside vehicle).

These decisions do not resolve whether officers may continue to detain passengers once they have addressed safety concerns. Cases after Wilson, although before Johnson, indicate that an officer must have reasonable suspicion to do so. See State v. Brewington, 170 N.C. App. 264 (2005) (officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by passenger to require that passenger remain at scene); Shearin, 170 N.C. App. at 235 (Wynn, J., concurring) (concurring judge disagrees with majority opinion to extent it suggests that officer may require passenger to remain in vehicle during traffic stop.
without any reason to believe that passenger poses threat to safety or is engaged in criminal activity).

Regardless whether officers may detain a passenger during a stop, a passenger may challenge the validity and duration of the stop and thus may suppress the results of any investigation after an invalid stop or unduly extended stop. See supra “Standing of passenger to challenge stop” in § 15.3E, Traffic Stops.

**Other actions involving passengers.** See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (questioning of passengers during traffic stop that did not relate to justification for stop did not measurably lengthen stop and was constitutionally permissible); Illinois v. Harris, 543 U.S. 1135 (2005) (court summarily vacates Illinois Supreme Court decision, which found that officers could not run warrant check on passenger that did not prolong otherwise valid traffic stop).

**Sweep of interior of vehicle.** Officers may conduct a protective sweep of the passenger compartment of a vehicle in areas where a weapon may be located—in other words, they may conduct a “vehicle frisk” but not a search for evidence—if the officers reasonably believe that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (stating standard); State v. Minor, 132 N.C. App. 478 (1999) (officer had insufficient grounds to search car for weapons); State v. Green, 103 N.C. App. 38 (1991) (officer could not look in glove compartment of defendant’s car as part of protective weapons search; officer had already placed defendant in patrol car and defendant could not obtain any weapon or other item from car); State v. Braxton, 90 N.C. App. 204 (1988) (facts did not warrant belief that suspect was dangerous and could gain control of weapon); see also infra § 15.6B, Search Incident to Arrest (discussing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), which precludes search of vehicle incident to arrest of occupant if purpose is to prevent occupant from obtaining weapon or destroying evidence and occupant has already been secured by officers).

For a further discussion of car sweeps, see Welty, Traffic Stops, at 7 (reviewing cases and observing that “North Carolina’s appellate courts have been fairly demanding regarding reasonable suspicion in this context, several times finding ambiguously furtive movements, standing alone, to be insufficient”), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2013-03-Traffic-Stops.pdf.

**License, warrant, and record checks.** See Welty, Traffic Stops, at 7 (reviewing authorities and observing that “courts have generally viewed these checks, and the associated brief delays, as permissible” during a traffic stop); see also infra § 15.4E, Nature, Length, and Purpose of Detention.

**C. Plain View**

Generally, observations by officers of things in “plain view” do not constitute a search. Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure is lawful under the plain view doctrine if the officer is lawfully in a position to observe the items and it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the items are evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. *See Horton v. California*, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (discovery of evidence need not be inadvertent if these two conditions are met). But see G.S. 15A-253 (under North Carolina law, discovery of evidence in plain view during execution of search warrant must be inadvertent).

Shining a flashlight into a vehicle that has been lawfully stopped is ordinarily not considered a search, so objects that officers observe thereby are considered to be in plain view. *See Texas v. Brown*, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); *see also* 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(b), at 617–18 (discussing limits on this doctrine—for example, officer may not open door to shine flashlight into car unless officer has grounds to open door); *Kyllo v. United States*, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of sense-enhancing technology—in this case, a thermal imager that detected relative amounts of heat within home—constituted search).

A defendant still may have grounds to suppress plain-view observations if the initial stop was invalid or, at the time of the observation, the officer was engaged in activity beyond the scope of the stop.

D. “Plain Feel” and Frisks for Evidence


**“Plain feel” exception.** Under what has come to be known as the “plain feel” doctrine, when an officer conducts a proper weapons frisk and has probable cause to believe that an object is evidence of a crime, then the officer may remove it. But, if an officer does not immediately recognize that the object is evidence of a crime, he or she may not manipulate or explore the object further; such action constitutes a search, which is not authorized as part of a weapons frisk. *See Minnesota v. Dickerson*, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (officer’s continued exploration of lump until he developed probable cause to believe it was cocaine was an unlawful search); *In re D.B.*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 714 S.E.2d 522 (2011) (during frisk of juvenile for weapons, officer’s removal of credit card, which turned out to be stolen, was not permissible; officer could not seize card on basis that juvenile did not identify himself and officer believed that card was identification card); *State v. Williams*, 195 N.C. App. 554 (2009) (under “plain feel” doctrine, officer must have probable cause to believe object is contraband; reasonable suspicion is insufficient); *State v. Wise*, 117 N.C. App. 105 (1994) (officer lawfully stopped vehicle for speeding and lawfully patted down defendant, but officer lacked cause to open non-transparent aspirin bottle that officer found on defendant); *State v. Beveridge*, 112 N.C. App. 688 (1993) (in frisking defendant for weapons, officer noticed cylindrical bulge that felt like plastic baggie; once officer determined that bulge was not weapon, he could not continue to search defendant to determine whether baggie contained illegal drugs), *aff’d per curiam*, 336 N.C. 601 (1994); *see also State v. Graves*, 135 N.C. App. 216 (1999) (warrantless search of wads of brown paper that fell from defendant’s clothing not justified under plain view doctrine because it was not immediately apparent that wads contained contraband); *State v. Sapatch*, 108 N.C. App. 321 (1992) (under plain view
doctrine, officers did not have probable cause to believe film canisters contained
evidence of crime and, therefore, were not justified in opening canisters); compare State
v. Robinson, 189 N.C. App. 454 (2008) (it was immediately apparent to officer that film
canister contained crack cocaine).

Even if an officer has probable cause to remove an object when frisking a person for
weapons, the officer may need a search warrant before inspecting the interior of the
object. See infra “Containers” in § 15.6D, Probable Cause to Search Person.

E. Nature, Length, and Purpose of Detention

Generally. As a general rule, an investigative detention must be temporary and last no
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491 (1983) (officers exceeded limits of Terry-stop and required probable cause); see
also G.S. 15A-1113(b) (an officer who has probable cause to believe a person has
committed an infraction may detain the person for a reasonable period of time to issue
and serve citation). Whether an officer has exceeded this general limit has been the
subject of considerable litigation, discussed below.

Requests for consent and questioning. Numerous cases have addressed whether an
officer’s questioning of a defendant or request for consent to search are permissible
during a stop based on reasonable suspicion. In arguing that questioning or a request for
consent were beyond the permissible scope of the stop, and therefore that evidence and
information discovered as a result must be suppressed, the defendant is in the strongest
position if the following factors are present: (1) the detention had not ended (that is, a
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave) at the time of the request for consent
or questioning; (2) the request or questions were not related to the basis for the stop; (3)
the request or questions unduly prolonged the detention beyond what was necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop; and (4) the officer had not developed reasonable
(driver and passengers were detained when officers had not yet returned license and
registration to driver; request for consent to search after reason for stop had ended
unconstitutionally prolonged stop); State v. Myles, 188 N.C. App. 42 (2008) (nervousness
of defendant and other passenger did not justify continued detention, questioning, and
request for consent to search after officer considered traffic stop complete; search of
defendant’s car was unlawful), aff’d per curiam, 362 N.C. 344 (2008); State v. Parker,
183 N.C. App. 1, 9 (2007) (“[w]ithout additional reasonable articulable suspicion of
additional criminal activity, the officer’s request for consent exceeds the scope of the
traffic stop and the prolonged detention violates the Fourth Amendment”; in this case,
officer had reasonable suspicion to request that passenger consent to search of her purse
after discovering what appeared to be a controlled substance in the door of the car next to
where passenger was sitting); State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299 (2005) (trooper
expanded scope of stop for seat belt violation by asking defendant about contraband and
weapons, but reasonable suspicion of criminal activity supported further detention); State
v. Sutton, 167 N.C. App. 242 (2004) (questioning of defendant during stop was
permissible; questions were brief and directly related to suspicion that gave rise to stop);
State v. Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. 251 (2004) (after traffic stop for erratic driving, officer developed reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity may have been afoot; officer could continue to detain defendant and ask for consent to search for drugs, and officer need not have had specific reasonable suspicion for requesting consent); State v. Castellon, 151 N.C. App. 675 (2002) (during traffic stop officer developed reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in illegal drug activity and was justified in asking for permission to search vehicle); State v. Beveridge, 112 N.C. App. 688 (1993) (once officer had frisked defendant for weapons, officer could not continue to search or question defendant), aff’d per curiam, 336 N.C. 601 (1994).

Whether questioning or a request for consent unduly prolongs a detention has become particularly important. This area of law is continuing to develop. In Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), the Court held that it was not unconstitutional during the execution of a search warrant for officers to question a lawfully detained person about her immigration status. The Court reasoned that the officers did not require reasonable suspicion to ask the person for identifying information because the questioning did not prolong the detention. In Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), the Court held that an officer’s questioning of passengers on matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop was constitutionally permissible because it did not measurably extend the duration of the stop. See also infra “Drug dog sniff during traffic stop” in § 15.4F, Drug Dogs (discussing cases in which courts have permitted de minimus delay for drug dog sniff during traffic stop).

Applying Muehler and Johnson, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized an important qualification on the duration of a traffic stop. The lawfulness of a delay in completing a stop depends not only on the length of the delay but also on whether the officer diligently pursued investigation of the purpose of the stop. If an officer abandons pursuit of the justification for the traffic stop and embarks on a sustained course of investigation into unrelated matters, the delay violates the Fourth Amendment and renders inadmissible evidence discovered during the unlawful detention. United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011).

The North Carolina appellate courts may treat requests for consent to search differently than questioning during a traffic stop, requiring reasonable suspicion to support a request for consent unrelated to the purpose of the stop. See State v. Parker, 183 N.C. App. 1, 9 (2007) (so stating).

The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to impose a time limit on the length of an investigative stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). One writer suggests that, unless circumstances warrant a longer stop, “an officer normally should not detain a suspect the officer has stopped longer than twenty minutes.” FARB at 43–44.

Consent after detention has ended. If the detention has ended and the person is free to leave, an officer generally may request consent to search. See State v. Heien, ___ N.C. App. ___, 741 S.E.2d 1 (2013) (over a dissent, majority concluded that after return of
documentation by police during traffic stop, defendant was aware that purpose of initial stop had been concluded and that further conversation, including request for and consent to search, was consensual); State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App. 421 (1990) (trooper did not detain defendant in patrol car longer than necessary to write citation, and after detention ended defendant consented to search); see also State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94 (2001) (questioning unrelated to traffic stop was permissible where defendant consented to being questioned after detention had ended).

In Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996), the state supreme court held that officers must clearly inform a motorist that a traffic stop has ended and that the motorist is free to go before requesting consent to search on an unrelated matter. Without this warning, the state court held, the motorist’s consent is involuntary. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected such a requirement, holding that the voluntariness of a motorist’s consent is evaluated under the totality of circumstances. Robinette does not affect the law on the permissible duration of a stop. If an officer detains a person longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, a request for consent to search may exceed the scope of the stop and violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) (on remand from U.S. Supreme Court, state supreme court found that officer exceeded scope of stop and that consent was therefore invalid). Any consent given must also be voluntary. See infra § 15.5D, Consent.

The return of paperwork to a driver may signal the end of a traffic stop, but it is not necessarily dispositive. See Welty, Traffic Stops, at 10 (so stating and reviewing North Carolina decisions and other authorities), available at http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2013-03-Traffic-Stops.pdf.

F. Drug Dogs

When a drug dog sniff is a search. Walking a drug dog around a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop (discussed further below) is generally not considered a search. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); State v. Branch, 177 N.C. App. 104 (2006) (following Caballes); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (use of a drug dog to sniff luggage in public place was not a search under Fourth Amendment). But cf. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (entering homeowner’s property and using drug-sniffing dog on homeowner’s porch to investigate contents of home is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). These and other cases suggest that a drug dog sniff of a person would generally be subject to Fourth Amendment limitations. See Shea Denning, Dog Sniffs of People and the Fourth Amendment, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=3911; 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(g), at 703–04 (discussing issue).

Effect of alert. An “alert” by a drug dog to a vehicle may constitute probable cause to search the vehicle if a sufficient showing is made as to the dog’s reliability to detect the presence of particular contraband. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (holding that dog sniff provided probable cause to search vehicle and refusing to set inflexible evidentiary requirements regarding a dog’s reliability; also indicating that

A drug dog’s positive alert to a vehicle does not give officers probable cause to search recent occupants of the vehicle. State v. Smith, ___ N.C. App. ___, 729 S.E.2d 120 (2012). For a discussion of related issues, see infra “Drug cases” in § 15.6E, Probable Cause to Search Vehicle.

**Drug dog sniff during traffic stop.** Although a drug dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle is generally not considered a search, use of a drug dog is impermissible if it unduly prolongs the stop and the officer does not have reasonable suspicion to justify the delay. See State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630 (1999) (canine unit did not arrive until 15 to 20 minutes after conclusion of traffic stop, but officer had reasonable suspicion beyond basis for traffic stop); State v. Sellars, ___ N.C. App. ___, 730 S.E.2d 208 (2012) (four-minute, 37-second delay to conduct drug dog sniff did not unduly prolong stop); State v. James Branch, 194 N.C. App. 173 (2008) (officer did not have grounds to detain defendant for canine unit to arrive after officer finished checking defendant’s license and registration); State v. Brimmer, 187 N.C. App. 451 (2007) (ninety-second delay for dog sniff was de minimus extension of traffic stop and did not require additional reasonable suspicion); State v. Euceda-Valle, 182 N.C. App. 268 (2007) (relying on McClendon, court finds that officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for canine sniff of exterior of vehicle after officer handed defendant warning ticket and traffic stop ended); State v. Monica Branch, 177 N.C. App. 104, 107 n.1 (2006) (suggesting that if drug dog sniff extends duration of stop, it may be unconstitutional); State v. Fisher, 141 N.C. App. 448 (2000) (detaining defendant after traffic stop for drug dog sniff exceeded scope of stop); State v. Falana, 129 N.C. App. 813 (1998) (officer exceeded scope of traffic stop by detaining defendant for dog to do drug sniff).

As with questioning and requests for consent during a traffic stop (see supra “Requests for consent and questioning” in § 15.4E, Nature, Length, and Purpose of Detention), the length of detention has become a significant factor in evaluating the lawfulness of drug dog sniffs unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop. This area of law is continuing to develop. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized an important qualification on the duration of a traffic stop. The lawfulness of a delay in completing a stop depends not only on the length of the delay but also on whether the officer diligently pursued investigation of the purpose of the stop. If an officer abandons pursuit of the justification for the traffic stop and embarks on a sustained course of investigation into unrelated matters, the delay violates the Fourth Amendment and renders inadmissible evidence discovered during the unlawful detention. United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011).
A drug dog sniff is also impermissible if it intrudes into protected areas—for example, the sniff is of the interior of the vehicle or of an occupant. If conducted at a license checkpoint, a drug dog sniff may indicate that the purpose of the checkpoint is general criminal investigation and thus impermissible. See supra § 15.3J, Motor Vehicle Checkpoints; § 15.3K, Drug and Other Checkpoints.

G. Does Miranda Apply?

A person generally is not entitled to Miranda warnings on a stop. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); State v. Braswell, ___ N.C. App. ___, 729 S.E.2d 697 (2012) (traffic stops are typically non-coercive in nature and do not amount to custodial interrogations). Once taken into custody, a person is entitled to Miranda warnings before police questioning. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (in case involving allegedly impaired driver who had been taken into custody, Miranda warnings were required for police question calling for testimonial response).

Some stops may amount to custody for Miranda purposes even though the person may not be under arrest. See Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (1994); see also State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332 (2001) (test for custody is whether there was formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of degree associated with formal arrest); State v. Washington, 330 N.C. 188 (1991) (on facts presented, defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when officer placed him in back seat of patrol car), rev’g 102 N.C. App. 535 (1991); State v. Hemphill, ___ N.C. App. ___, 723 S.E.2d 142, 147 (2012) (holding that “a reasonable person in Defendant’s position, having been forced to the ground by an officer with a taser drawn and in the process of being handcuffed, would have felt his freedom of movement had been restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest”); State v. Johnston, 154 N.C. App. 500 (2002) (defendant who was ordered out of his vehicle at gun point, handcuffed, placed in the back of a patrol car, and questioned by detectives was in custody for Miranda purposes).

H. Field Sobriety Tests

North Carolina cases have assumed (although have not specifically decided) that during a stop based on reasonable suspicion of impaired driving, field sobriety tests and questioning related to possible impairment are within the scope of the stop. See generally Blasi v. State, 893 A.2d 1152 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (finding field sobriety tests permissible on traffic stop if officer has reasonable suspicion that driver is under the influence of alcohol); see also State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397 (Utah 2007) (off-duty officer had reasonable suspicion to stop driver for impaired driving, but stop became de facto arrest and violated Fourth Amendment when off-duty officer transported driver more than a mile away from the scene for on-duty officer to conduct field sobriety tests).

Conversely, if officers do not have reasonable suspicion of impaired driving, field sobriety tests are not within the permissible scope of the stop. See Jeff Welty, Field Sobriety Tests During Traffic Stops, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Apr. 14, 2009) (reviewing
Once the defendant is considered to be in custody, *Miranda* warnings are required for questions calling for a testimonial response. *See supra § 15.4G, Does Miranda Apply?* Field sobriety tests may not require a testimonial response, however. *See State v. Flannery*, 31 N.C. App. 617, 623–24 (1976) (“the physical dexterity tests are not evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature . . . and are not within the scope of the *Miranda* decision”; court therefore holds that admitting evidence of defendant’s refusal to do tests did not violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; court also notes that *Miranda* warnings are not required for similar reasons before a breath test); *see also State v. White*, 84 N.C. App. 111, 115–16 (1987) (*Miranda* warnings not required before administering a breath test because results not testimonial).

I. Defendant’s Name

In *Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada*, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a defendant’s conviction under a state statute requiring an individual stopped by police on the basis of reasonable suspicion to identify himself or herself. The Court stated, “Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself in the course of a *Terry* stop, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer.” *Id.* at 186–87. The Court held in this case that the stop was justified and the request for the defendant’s name was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop (a suspected assault); therefore, enforcement of the state law requirement that the defendant give his name during the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court also found no violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because in this case the defendant’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him or would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him.

North Carolina does not have a statute comparable to Nevada’s statute requiring a person who is the subject of an investigative stop, other than a person driving a vehicle, to disclose his or her name. *See G.S. 20-29* (person operating motor vehicle may be required to give his or her name). “Officers who lawfully stop someone for investigation may ask the person a moderate number of questions to determine his identity . . . .” *State v. Steen*, 352 N.C. 227, 239 (2000) (citing *Berkemer v. McCarty*, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)). However, a person’s mere refusal to disclose his or her name (when the person is not driving a vehicle) would appear insufficient to support a charge of violating G.S. 14-223 (resisting, delaying, or obstructing officer). *See also In re D.B.*, __ N.C. App. __, 714 S.E.2d 522 (2011) (officers may not search person during investigative stop to determine his or her identity).

J. VIN Checks

Officers may make a limited warrantless search of a vehicle when they need to determine its ownership. *See New York v. Class*, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (check of vehicle
identification number valid); State v. Green, 103 N.C. App. 38 (1991) (check invalid on facts of case).

15.5 Did the Officer Have Grounds to Arrest or Search?

A. Probable Cause

**Required for arrest or search.** Although reasonable suspicion may be sufficient to support an officer’s initial stop and certain investigative actions during the stop, an officer must have probable cause to make an arrest or probable cause or consent to search for evidence. See, e.g., State v. Joe, ___ N.C. App. ___, 730 S.E.2d 779 (2012) (officers did not have probable cause to arrest, and evidence discovered as a result of illegal arrest suppressed), review granted, ___ N.C. ___, 736 S.E.2d 187 (2013); State v. Wise, 117 N.C. App. 105 (1994) (officer lawfully stopped vehicle for speeding and lawfully patted down defendant, but officer lacked probable cause to open non-transparent aspirin bottle that officer found on defendant); State v. Pittman, 111 N.C. App. 808 (1993) (initial encounter was consensual and subsequent stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, but officers did not have probable cause to search). Compare Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (police officer had probable cause to believe that defendant, who was the front-seat passenger in vehicle, committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly with other occupants of vehicle; defendant was one of three men riding in the vehicle at 3:16 a.m., $763 of rolled-up cash was found in the glove compartment directly in front of defendant, five plastic baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat armrest and accessible to all three vehicle occupants, and the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or money; defendant’s admissions to police after lawful arrest and Miranda warnings not subject to suppression).

**Scope of search.** The permissible scope of a search depends on whether the officers have probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. For a further discussion of whether officers have probable cause to arrest or search and the permissible scope of the search, including in drug cases, see infra § 15.6, Did the Officer Act within the Scope of the Arrest or Search?

B. Circumstances Requiring Arrest Warrant and Other Limits on Arrest Authority

**Arrest warrant.** Usually, when an officer develops probable cause to arrest during a stop, the officer may make the arrest without a warrant. In some instances, however, a warrant may be required. An officer who has probable cause to arrest for a criminal offense may make an arrest without a warrant in the following circumstances: (a) the crime is committed in the officer’s presence; or (b) the crime was not committed by the person in the officer’s presence but (i) the crime is a felony; (ii) the crime is one of certain listed misdemeanors; or (iii) the crime is a misdemeanor and, unless arrested immediately, the person will not be apprehended or may cause physical injury or property damage. See
G.S. 15A-401(b) (also authorizing warrantless arrest for violation of pretrial release conditions).

Violations not subject to arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment if they have probable cause to make an arrest for a criminal offense even if state law does not authorize an arrest for that offense. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (Virginia law enforcement officers who had probable cause to arrest defendant for a misdemeanor did not violate Fourth Amendment when they arrested him and conducted search incident to arrest although state law did not authorize an arrest); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (Fourth Amendment does not bar officer from making warrantless arrest for criminal offense punishable by fine only, in this case a seat belt violation, a misdemeanor under Texas law).

An arrest permitted by the U.S. Constitution but in violation of North Carolina law may still be subject to suppression under G.S. 15A-974. Under North Carolina law, an officer has no authority to arrest for infractions, such as seat belt violations, which are noncriminal violations of law in North Carolina. See G.S. 15A-1113; FAR B at 82 (noting limitation). An arrest for a noncriminal infraction also may violate the U.S. Constitution. See Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (U.S. Constitution authorizes arrest for minor misdemeanors; Court does not address noncriminal infractions).

An officer has no authority to arrest for a wildlife violation, whether a misdemeanor or infraction, by an out-of-state resident if the other state is a member of the interstate wildlife compact, the person agrees to comply with the terms of any citation, and the person provides adequate identification. See G.S. 113-300.6, art. III.

For a further discussion of the effect of state law violations, see supra § 14.5, Substantial Violations of Criminal Procedure Act.

C. Circumstances Requiring Search Warrant

For search of person. If officers have probable cause to arrest a person, they may search the person incident to arrest without a warrant. For cases discussing probable cause to arrest and potential limits on a search of a person incident to arrest, see infra § 15.6B, Search Incident to Arrest; § 15.6C, Other Limits on Searches Incident to Arrest.

If officers have probable cause to search a person, but not arrest him or her, the officers must have exigent circumstances to conduct the search without a warrant. For a discussion of exigent circumstances and potential limits on searches, see infra § 15.6D, Probable Cause to Search Person.

For search of vehicle. Generally, if officers have probable cause to search a vehicle, they may search without a warrant. For a discussion of probable cause to search a vehicle and limits on such searches, see infra § 15.6E, Probable Cause to Search Vehicle.
D. Consent

Officers may search without probable cause and without a warrant if they obtain consent. For various reasons a purported consent to search may be invalid or insufficient.

Effect of illegal detention. If a person is detained illegally, a consent to search obtained thereafter is subject to suppression on two potential grounds. First, the consent is generally considered the fruit of the poisonous tree because the consent is obtained as a result of the illegal seizure. See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see also supra § 14.2F, “Fruits” of Illegal Search or Arrest. Second, the consent may be involuntary in the totality of the circumstances, including the circumstances surrounding the illegal detention.

Length of detention. Officers may not unduly detain a person for the purpose of requesting consent to search. See supra § 15.4E, Nature, Length, and Purpose of Detention.

Clarity of consent. “There must be a clear and unequivocal consent” to authorize a consent search. State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 277 (1988) (consent to search of car was not consent to search of person; acquiescence to frisk when officer told defendant he was going to frisk him also was not consent to search).

Voluntariness of consent. Consent must be voluntary. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness determined from totality of circumstances); State v. Crenshaw, 144 N.C. App. 574 (2001) (State has burden of proving voluntariness); United States v. Guerrero, 374 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2004) (reasonable officer would not have believed that Spanish-speaking driver knowingly and voluntarily consented to search of his car; driver’s signature on consent-to-search form written in Spanish was not sufficient); United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1999) (defendant did not give voluntary consent when he said, “You’ve got the badge, I guess you can” in response to officer’s request to search); see also supra § 14.2H, Invalid Consent.

A threat to obtain a search warrant may affect the voluntariness of consent in some circumstances. See Jeff Welty, Consent to Search under Threat of Search Warrant, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’R BLOG (Nov. 10, 2010) (observing that threat alone may not render consent involuntary but may be considered as part of totality of circumstances), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=1741; 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(c), at 92–100 (indicating circumstances in which such a threat may render a consent involuntary).

Miranda warnings are not required on a request for consent to search. See State v. Cummings, 188 N.C. App. 598 (2008) (so holding in reliance on federal cases, in which courts reasoned that request for consent to search does not constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes because the giving of consent is not an incriminating statement).

Authority to consent. The person must have authority to consent or, at least, the officer
must reasonably believe the person has authority. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (officers must reasonably believe person has authority to give consent); G.S. 15A-222 (to same effect); compare State v. McLees, 994 P.2d 683 (Mont. 2000) (rejecting apparent authority doctrine under state constitution; for consent to be valid against defendant, third party must have actual authority to give consent to search); State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889 (Haw. 1995) (to same effect).

Whether an officer’s belief is reasonable depends on the facts of each case. See State v. Jones, 161 N.C. App. 615 (2003) (after seeing police, defendant entered car, removed his jacket, put it on back seat, and then exited, wearing t-shirt in freezing winter weather; driver had authority to give consent to search entire car, including jacket left by defendant); State v. McDaniels, 103 N.C. App. 175 (1991) (passenger failed to object when driver consented to search of car and contents; search of contents upheld), aff’d per curiam, 331 N.C. 112 (1992); compare United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 2008) (female’s apparent authority to consent to search of luggage dissipated once officers realized that luggage contained only male’s effects); State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (driver lacked authority to consent to search of defendant’s suitcase in trunk of driver’s car; officer has obligation to ascertain ownership of items not owned by or within control of the person purportedly giving consent when circumstances do not clearly indicate that the person is the owner or controls item to be searched); State v. Matejka, 621 N.W.2d 891, 894 n.3 (Wis. 2001) (collecting cases on consent to search passenger’s belongings); People v. James, 645 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. 1994) (driver consented to search outside of hearing of defendant-passerenger; consent did not authorize police to search purse on passenger’s seat). See also 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(g), at 232–52 (discussing significance of reasonable but mistaken belief by police that third party has authority over place searched).

See also infra “Passenger belongings” in § 15.6C, Other Limits on Searches Incident to Arrest; “Passenger belongings” in § 15.6E, Probable Cause to Search Vehicle.

Scope of consent. General consent does not necessarily extend to all places within the area to be searched. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (consent to general search of car would lead reasonable officer to believe that consent extended to unlocked containers that might hold object of search); State v. Stone, 362 N.C. 50 (2007) (officer exceeded scope of consent by pulling sweat pants away from defendant’s body and shining flashlight on defendant’s groin area); State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272 (1998) (defendant’s consent to search of car did not authorize search of his person); State v. Neal, 190 N.C. App. 453 (2008) (female defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to strip search by female officer); State v. Johnson, 177 N.C. App. 122 (2006) (consent to search of van did not authorize officer to pry open wall panel of van; general consent did not include intentional infliction of damage to vehicle), vacated in part on other grounds, 360 N.C. 541 (2006) (vacating portion of opinion finding that officers lacked probable cause, independent of consent, to pry open wall panel and remanding case to trial court for further findings of fact). See also Jeff Welty, Scope of Consent to Search a Vehicle, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012) (suggesting that consent to search vehicle does not authorize damaging of vehicle), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=3402.
Withdrawal of consent. A person may withdraw consent at any time before completion of the search. See 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1(c), at 57–65. Before withdrawal of consent, however, officers may have uncovered sufficient evidence to justify continuing the search regardless of the presence or absence of consent.

15.6 Did the Officer Act within the Scope of the Arrest or Search?

A. Questioning Following Arrest

Following a lawful arrest, officers must give an in-custody defendant Miranda warnings before questioning him or her. For a discussion of Miranda principles, see supra § 14.3B, Miranda Violations.

B. Search Incident to Arrest

Of person. Officers may search a person incident to a lawful arrest of that person. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Whether officers may search containers in the person’s possession is discussed further infra in “Containers” in § 15.6C, Other Limits on Searches Incident to Arrest.

Of vehicle. Previously, officers could search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, including containers found within, incident to a lawful arrest of an occupant. See State v. Logner, 148 N.C. App. 135 (2001) (warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle proper incident to arrest of passenger). The stated rationale for this rule was that officers needed a bright-line rule allowing them to search in areas where an arrestee might be able to use a weapon or destroy evidence. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (stating basic rule); see also State v. Andrews, 306 N.C. 144 (1982) (applying Belton principles to search of vehicle incident to arrest); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701 (1982) (to same effect).

In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court held that lower courts had read Belton too broadly and ruled that the permissible scope of a search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant of the vehicle was much narrower. The Court ruled that an officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant only if (1) the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment and thus able to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence or (2) it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found. Gant overrules North Carolina decisions allowing an unlimited search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest of an occupant of the vehicle. See State v. Carter, 191 N.C. App. 152 (2008) (holding that Belton does not require that search incident to arrest of occupant of vehicle be only for evidence connected to the crime charged), vacated and remanded, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2158 (2009), on remand, 200 N.C. App. 47 (2009) (suppressing evidence in light of Gant and lack of any other ground to uphold search).

Generally, once officers have secured an arrestee—by, for example, handcuffing the
arrestee—they may not search the vehicle based on the first ground identified in Gant. Most post-Gant cases have therefore involved the second ground for a search of a vehicle and focused on whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe evidence of the crime of arrest would be in the vehicle. See State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C.403 (2012) (analogizing the “reasonable to believe” standard in the second prong of Gant to the “reasonable suspicion” standard of a Terry stop).

Typically, an arrest for a motor vehicle offense will not justify a search incident to arrest on the second Gant ground because it will not be reasonable for an officer to believe that evidence relevant to the motor vehicle offense may be found in the vehicle. See FARB at 225–26 (so stating). A number of cases have reached this result. See Meister v. Indiana, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2155 (2009) (court summarily vacates state court decision allowing search of vehicle incident to arrest of driver for suspended driver’s license; case remanded for reconsideration in light of Gant); State v. Johnson, 204 N.C. App. 259 (2010) (disallowing search following arrest for suspended license); State v. Carter, 200 N.C. App. 47 (2009) (disallowing search following arrest for driving with expired registration tag and failing to notify Division of Motor Vehicles of change of address).

It is also unlikely that officers would have grounds to search a vehicle incident to arrest of an occupant for an outstanding arrest warrant. See FARB at 226.

In cases involving gun and drug offenses, courts have found that the officers had a reasonable basis to believe evidence of the offense of arrest could be found in the vehicle. The N.C. Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that a search of a vehicle incident to arrest of an occupant may “not routinely be based on the nature or type of the offense of arrest and that the circumstances of each case ordinarily will determine the propriety of any vehicular searches conducted incident to an arrest.” See State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403 (2012) (upholding search following arrest for carrying concealed weapon); State v. Watkins, ___ N.C. App. ___, 725 S.E.2d 400 (2012) (upholding search following arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia); State v. Foy, 208 N.C. App. 562 (2010) (upholding search following arrest for carrying concealed weapon); see also State v. Toledo, 204 N.C. App. 170 (2010) (holding that officers had probable cause to search vehicle for marijuana; also suggesting that officers may have had grounds to search vehicle incident to arrest of defendant for possession of marijuana).

C. Other Limits on Searches Incident to Arrest

Arizona v. Gant, discussed in subsection B., above, significantly limits the circumstances in which officers may search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a vehicle’s occupant. Additional limits on searches of people and vehicles incident to arrest are discussed below, based on additional case law and Gant.

Citations. Officers may not search a person or vehicle incident to issuance of a citation if they do not arrest the person. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); State v. Fisher, 141 N.C. App. 448 (2000) (defendant had been issued citation for driving while license revoked but had not been placed under arrest; search could not be justified as search
incident to arrest); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968) (“It is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification.”); FARb at 223 (search may be made before actual arrest if arrest is made contemporaneously with search, but whatever is found during search before formal arrest cannot be used to support probable cause for the arrest).

**Area and people.** Cases before *Gant* permitted a search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest of an occupant of a vehicle, but not other areas, such as the vehicle’s trunk, and not other occupants of the vehicle.

*Gant* does not appear to modify these limitations. See FARb at 226 (so stating); see also *Owens v. Kentucky*, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2155 (2009) (court summarily vacates state court decision authorizing automatic pat down of passengers when officers arrest a vehicle occupant and are preparing to conduct search incident to arrest; case remanded for reconsideration in light of *Gant*); *State v. Schiro*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 723 S.E.2d 134 (2012) (search of trunk of vehicle not valid as search incident to arrest of vehicle occupant; however, search was valid based on defendant’s consent).

**Containers.** Before *Gant*, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that officers may not search locked containers incident to arrest of a person. See *State v. Thomas*, 81 N.C. App. 200 (1986) (officers could not search, incident to arrest, locked suitcase arrestee was carrying); cf. *State v. Brooks*, 337 N.C. 132 (1994) (officers may search locked compartments within vehicle as part of search incident to arrest).

*Gant* may limit searches of containers, whether locked or unlocked or whether following arrest of a person or arrest of an occupant of a vehicle. If officers cannot satisfy either ground identified in *Gant* for a search incident to arrest—that is, if the arrestee was secured and could not reach the container, and there was not a reasonable basis to believe that the container contained evidence related to the offense of arrest—officers may not be able to search containers incident to arrest. See Jeff Welty, *Is Arizona v. Gant Limited to Automobiles?*, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Sept. 2, 2010) (making this point and citing cases from other jurisdictions to that effect), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=1565; FARb at 224–25 n.338;

**Cell phones.** Cell phones are a form of container but, because of the wide range of data they may contain, may present tricky issues about the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest. The N.C. Supreme Court has upheld the search of a cell phone found on a person incident to arrest of the person, but did not specifically consider the impact of *Arizona v. Gant* or other potential issues. *State v. Wilkerson*, 363 N.C. 382, 432–34 (2009); see also Jeff Welty, *Warrantless Searches of Computers and Other Electronic Devices*, at 7–8 (UNC School of Government, Apr. 2011) (listing cases from around the country on this issue), available at http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2011-05-PDF-of-Handout-re-Warrantless-Ssearches.pdf; Jeff Welty, *Georgia Case on Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest*, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010)
Non-contemporaneous search of vehicle. Before *Gant*, some courts precluded a non-contemporaneous search of a vehicle following arrest of an occupant. *See Preston v. United States*, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (where vehicle had been towed to garage, search of vehicle was not contemporaneous with arrest and was disallowed); *United States v. Vasey*, 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987) (search of vehicle was not contemporaneous with arrest where search took place 30 to 45 minutes after occupant had been arrested, handcuffed, and placed in back of patrol car).

This limitation is implicit in the first ground for a search permitted by *Gant* because in virtually all instances the arrestee will not be within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of a non-contemporaneous search. The courts also may be unwilling to allow vehicle searches long after arrest based on the “reasonable to believe” standard described in *Gant* and may require full probable cause or other grounds for non-contemporaneous searches. *See infra* § 15.6E, Probable Cause to Search Vehicle; § 15.6F, Inventory Search.


Recent occupancy. In *Thornton v. United States*, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), a majority of the Court held that the *Belton* doctrine allowed a search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle after arrest of an “occupant” or “recent occupant.” In *Thornton*, the Court found that the defendant was a recent occupant when he parked his car and exited right before the officer could pull the car over. *Thornton* appears to remain good law after *Gant*. Thus, if a person is not a “recent occupant” of the vehicle in question when approached by officers, a search of the vehicle incident to arrest of the person remains impermissible. *See State v. Dean*, 76 P.3d 429 (Ariz. 2003) (officers could not search defendant’s car incident to arrest; defendant was not “recent occupant” of car when he had not occupied car for some two-and-one-half hours and his arrest occurred not in close proximity to automobile, which was parked in his driveway, but inside his residence). If a person is a recent occupant, officers still must meet one of the two grounds identified in *Gant* for a search of a vehicle incident to arrest of the person.

Passenger belongings. A passenger has standing to contest a search of his or her belongings within a vehicle, such as a purse, incident to arrest of an occupant of the vehicle. *See State v. Mackey*, 209 N.C. App. 116 (2011) (recognizing principle but holding that passenger asserted no possessory interest in vehicle or contents and did not have standing to contest search of vehicle resulting in discovery of weapon under seat).
**Pretext.** Before *Whren* (discussed supra § 15.3I, Pretext), it could be argued that a search incident to arrest violates the Fourth Amendment if the officers arrest the person, rather than issue a citation, as a pretext to search the person incident to arrest. In *Arkansas v. Sullivan*, 532 U.S. 769 (2001), the Court extended the rule in *Whren* to arrests, holding that an officer’s decision to arrest a person for a traffic violation, if supported by probable cause, is not invalid even though the arrest is a pretext for a narcotics search incident to arrest. (On remand, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a pretextual arrest violates the state constitution. See *State v. Sullivan*, 74 S.W.3d 215 (Ark. 2002).)

**D. Probable Cause to Search Person**

**Person.** Officers may conduct a warrantless search of a person whom they have not arrested if both probable cause to search and exigent circumstances exist. See, e.g., *State v. Williams*, 209 N.C. App. 255 (2011) (probable cause existed to believe defendant possessed illegal drugs and exigent circumstances existed based on belief that defendant was attempting to swallow them; permissible for officer to conduct warrantless search of the defendant’s mouth by grabbing him around the throat, pushing him onto the hood of a vehicle, and demanding that he spit out whatever he was trying to swallow); *State v. Yates*, 162 N.C. App. 118 (2004) (officer had probable cause to search defendant based on strong odor of marijuana about defendant’s person; exigent circumstances justified immediate warrantless search); *State v. Smith*, 118 N.C. App. 106, rev’d on other grounds, 342 N.C. 407 (1995); *State v. Watson*, 119 N.C. App. 395 (1995).

**Containers.** Officers may conduct a warrantless search of a container found on a person whom they have not arrested if both probable cause to search and exigent circumstances exist. If exigent circumstances do not exist, they must obtain a search warrant. See *State v. Simmons*, 201 N.C. App. 698 (2010) (officers did not have probable cause to search bag or vehicle based on defendant’s statements that bag contained cigar guts); *FARB* at 216–17 (discussing rule and exceptions); *State v. Gilkey*, 18 P.3d 402 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (officers could seize chapstick container found during frisk but could not open it without a warrant).

**Strip searches based on probable cause.** Because of their intrusiveness, roadside strip searches require a greater justification than other warrantless searches based on probable cause. Officers must have specific probable cause that the defendant is hiding the items (usually, drugs) on his or her person. Further, there must be “exigent circumstances that show some significant government or public interest would be endangered were the police to wait until they could conduct the search in a more discreet location.” *State v. Fowler*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 725 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2012) (citation omitted). The strip search also must be conducted in a reasonable manner. See also supra “Strip search during search incident to arrest” in § 15.6C, Other Limits on Searches Incident to Arrest (applying similar standard).

(stating that showing of exigent circumstances was not required where officer had specific basis for believing weapons or contraband were under defendant’s clothing) and Fowler, ___ N.C. App. ___, 725 S.E.2d 624 (finding exigent circumstances and upholding strip search). See also State v. Smith, 118 N.C. App. 106 (1995) (court of appeals holds that although officers’ warrantless search was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, search was unreasonable where officers required defendant to pull down his pants on public street, shined a flashlight on his scrotum, and reached underneath his scrotum to remove paper towel), rev’d in pertinent part, 342 N.C. 407 (1995) (court adopts dissenting opinion, which found that search was not unreasonable under circumstances).

E. Probable Cause to Search Vehicle

Generally. Officers may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, including the trunk and closed containers, if they have probable cause to believe the objects of the search may be located there. The rationale for what is known as the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is that cars are capable of being moved quickly and people have a reduced expectation of privacy in cars. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (stating general standard); State v. Holmes, 109 N.C. App. 615 (1993) (to same effect); State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586 (1993) (to same effect); see also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (police do not need warrant to seize vehicle from public place when they have probable cause to believe that vehicle itself is forfeitable contraband). If probable cause exists to search an automobile, officers may conduct an immediate search at the scene, or a later search at the police station, without a warrant. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570.

The scope of a warrantless search of a vehicle based on probable cause is broad but not unlimited. “The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile . . . is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824–25 (1982) (holding that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search; also observing that “[p]robable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab”).

Passenger belongings. In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), the Court held that officers with probable cause to search a car may search passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. Compare State v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419 (Kan. 2003) (distinguishing Houghton, the court held that officers could not search a passenger’s purse as part of their search of a car when they had ordered her to leave her purse in the car and they did not have probable cause to search the car or passenger at the time they gave the order).

Probable cause to search a car and its contents does not necessarily authorize officers to search passengers themselves. Nor does it necessarily authorize searches of passengers’
belongings in other contexts—for example, when the driver but not the passenger consents to a search. See supra § 15.5D, Consent.

**Seizure of object.** Before seizing an object found during a search of a vehicle, officers must have probable cause to believe that the object constitutes evidence of a crime. See *State v. Bartlett*, 130 N.C. App. 79 (1998) (no probable cause to seize plastic-like substance found in car, which upon later laboratory analysis turned out to be controlled substance, because officers admitted that they did not know what substance was at time of seizure).

**Drug cases.** In *Maryland v. Dyson*, 527 U.S. 465 (1999), the Court reaffirmed that a finding of probable cause that a vehicle contains contraband satisfies the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement. At issue in such cases are what circumstances amount to probable cause to search and where officers may search. See generally *State v. Poczontek*, 90 N.C. App. 455 (1988) (officer lacked probable cause to search car for drugs based on informant’s tip and officer’s observations after stop).

When an officer detects the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, probable cause exists for a warrantless search of the vehicle for marijuana. See *State v. Smith*, 192 N.C. App. 690 (2008) (so holding). Officers may search in areas of the car where they reasonably believe marijuana may be found. See *State v. Toledo*, 204 N.C. App. 170 (2010) (officer noted odor of marijuana from spare tire in the luggage area after defendant had validly consented to a search of the vehicle; after conducting a “ping test” by pressing the tire valve of the spare tire and noting a very strong odor of marijuana, officer searched second spare tire located under the vehicle; court finds that after first ping test, officer had probable cause to search second tire); compare *Commonwealth v. Garden*, 883 N.E.2d 905 (Mass. 2008) (odor of burnt marijuana on clothes of vehicle’s occupant gave officer probable cause to search passenger compartment of vehicle; officer did not have probable cause, however, to search vehicle’s trunk because officer could not reasonably believe that source of smell of burnt marijuana would be found in trunk), abrogated on other grounds, *Commonwealth v. Lobo*, 978 N.E.2d 807 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).

Probable cause to search a vehicle for drugs does not necessarily give officers probable cause to search recent occupants of the vehicle. See *State v. Smith*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 729 S.E.2d 120 (2012) (drug dog’s positive alert to a vehicle does not give officers probable cause to search recent occupants of the vehicle); see also *Bailey v. United States*, 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (search warrant does not justify the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises covered by a search warrant; in this case, the defendant left the premises before the search began and officers waited to detain him until he had driven about one mile away, which was impermissible in absence of other grounds for detention). But cf. *State v. Mitchell*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 735 S.E.2d 438 (2012) (possession of marijuana blunt by passenger gave officer probable cause to search car in which passenger was riding).
F. Inventory Search

**Arrestees.** Officers may search and inventory possessions of arrestee. See FARB at 229.

**Vehicles.** Officers may *impound* a vehicle if pursuant to departmental policy and grounds for impoundment exist, such as the need to safeguard the vehicle and its contents. Officers may *inventory* the vehicle and its contents if pursuant to departmental policy. See *State v. Phifer*, 297 N.C. 216 (1979) (failure to follow standardized procedure; inventory search suppressed); *State v. Peaten*, 110 N.C. App. 749 (1993) (inadequate grounds to impound vehicle; inventory search suppressed); FARB at 233–34 (discussing impoundment and inventory of vehicles).

**Pretext.** Inventory searches may be challenged as pretextual. See supra § 15.3I, Pretext.